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OVERCOMING TRADEOFFS IN THE TAXATION 
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
DAN MARKEL
 
ABSTRACT 
As explained in a companion piece, there is a curious anomaly in the 
law of punitive damages. Jurors assess punitive damages in an amount 
that they believe will best “punish” the defendant. But, in fact, business 
defendants are not always punished to the degree that the jury intends. 
This is because jurors do not take into account the fact that these 
businesses are allowed to deduct their punitive damages awards. To solve 
this problem, President Obama recently proposed to make all punitive 
damages nondeductible, a proposal that has in the past been supported by 
a number of policy makers and academics. Unfortunately, the 
nondeductibility rule is doomed to fail in practice. 
Instead, the under-punishment problem is better solved through making 
juries and courts aware of the tax implications of punitive damages 
awards. While tax awareness would better address the under-punishment 
problem, it would at the same time increase plaintiffs’ windfalls. Sadly, 
there is simply no way under current punitive damages law to reduce 
under-punishment without simultaneously augmenting plaintiff windfalls. 
 
 
  D‘Alemberte Professor, Florida State University College of Law; Scholar in Residence, NYU 
Center for Administration of Criminal Law (2011). This Article grew out of a wonderful collaboration 
with Gregg Polsky, my former colleague at FSU, now at UNC–Chapel Hill. It is fair to say that much 
of the analysis of the tax rules here would not have been possible in the absence of his tremendous 
help with this paper, as well as our jointly authored companion article to this one. See Gregg D. Polsky 
& Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295 (2010). A few other tax scholars were 
especially helpful in clarifying the arguments here, and I thank Josh Blank, Brian Galle, Steve 
Johnson, Leigh Osofsky, and Larry Zelenak for their particular assistance. This piece is part of a larger 
project related to punitive damages, and I am grateful for comments and conversations on this project 
as a whole, as well as this aspect of it, to Miriam Baer, Shawn Bayern, Beth Burch, Michael Cahill, 
Jack Chin, Danielle Citron, Tom Colby, Robin Craig, Joseph Dodge, Mike Dorff, Dave Fagundes, 
Brian Galle, Tom Galligan, Rick Garnett, Mark Geistfeld, Shubha Ghosh, Tara Grove, Andy Hessick, 
Carissa Hessick, Brant Hellwig, Adam Hirsch, Dave Hoffman, Keith Hylton, Steve Johnson, Adam 
Kolber, Erik Knutsen, Susan Kuo, Ethan Leib, Wayne Logan, Chris Lund, Caleb Mason, Marty 
McMahon, Richard Myers, Mitch Polinsky, Michael O‘Hear, Alice Ristroph, Christopher Robertson, 
Mark Seidenfeld, Cathy Sharkey, Jason Solomon, Tony Sebok, Suja Thomas, Franita Tolson, Bill 
Turnier, Manuel Utset, Neil Vidmar, David Walker, Sonja West, Adam Winkler, Verity Winship, 
Ekow Yankah, Jeff Yates & Ben Zipursky; participants at faculty workshops at CLEA, Florida State, 
and Southwestern-Prawfsfest! 2009; and the students in my 2009 seminar on punitive damages. For 
excellent research assistance, I thank Matt Daley, Will Ourand, Tiffany Roddenberry & Nancy 
Rumberger. Comments are welcome: markel@post.harvard.edu. 
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The tradeoff is a byproduct of the jumbled way current punitive damages 
law engrafts “public law” values on a private dispute resolution system 
not entirely capable of effectuating those values.  
To avoid such an unfortunate tradeoff, reform of punitive damages law 
would be required. This Article sketches a vision of such reform and 
describes its corresponding tax rules. In particular, the appropriate tax 
treatment of tort damages should depend on the particular purpose(s) 
being pursued and vindicated. In this respect, the recommendations here 
stake out a more nuanced middle path between those scholars and policy 
makers touting nondeductibility for all punitive damages and those 
endorsing the current rule allowing a deduction for all punitive damages 
paid by business defendants.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A few years ago, an Oregon jury socked tobacco giant Philip Morris 
with punitive damages of almost $80 million in a case involving one 
person‘s death.1 In another case, a trial court imposed a penalty of $5 
billion in punitive damages against Exxon for its reckless conduct in the 
Valdez oil spill.
2
 Should these corporate payments of punitive damages be 
tax-deductible business expenses? Perhaps surprisingly, they are; put 
simply, punitive damages incurred in connection with the defendant‘s 
business are tax deductible.
3 
Consequently, the intersection of tort and tax law in many jurisdictions 
leads to a curious under-punishment problem. On the one hand, jurors 
assess punitive damages in an amount that they believe will best ―punish‖ 
the defendant.
4
 On the other hand, defendants are not always punished to 
the degree that the jury intends because punitive damages paid by business 
defendants are tax deductible under the Internal Revenue Code.
5
 As a 
result, these defendants often pay far less in real dollars than the jury 
believed they deserved to pay.  
Some scholars argue that the best way to address this problem is simply 
to make punitive damages nondeductible in all cases.
6
 Indeed, President 
 
 
 1. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 350 (2007) (reviewing surviving spouse‘s 
claim for deceit against defendant). 
 2. That award was later reduced to $1 billion by the Supreme Court. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008). 
 3. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006) (allowing deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses 
incurred in carrying on a trade or business); Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 58 (―Amounts paid as 
punitive damages incurred by the taxpayer in the ordinary conduct of its business operations are 
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162 of the Code.‖).  
 4. The claims in this Article are limited to the American legal context. The punishment rationale 
of punitive damages has often been articulated by courts. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2621 
(―Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are 
aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.‖); Philip 
Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 352 (reaffirming the Court‘s long-held view that it is ―clear that ‗[p]unitive 
damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.‘‖ (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996))); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 432 (2001); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266 (1981); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (describing punitive damages as ―private fines‖ 
designed to punish and deter ―reprehensible conduct‖).  
 5. See supra note 3 and infra Part I.A. 
 6. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who 
Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825, 881 (1996) 
(arguing that punitive damages ought to be made nondeductible); K. Todd Curry, Comment, The 
Deductibility of Punitive Damages as an Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense: Reviving the 
Public Policy Doctrine, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 369 (1989) (same); Catherine M. Del Castillo, 
Note, Should Punitive Damages Be Nondeductible? The Expansion of the Public-Policy Doctrine, 68 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Barack Obama in February 2010 proposed this solution as part of his fiscal 
year 2011 budget.
7
 
As Gregg Polsky and I explained in greater detail in a companion 
article,
8
 the tactic of using a blanket nondeductibility rule for punitive 
damages would not work in most situations. Defendants could easily 
circumvent the nondeductibility rule by disguising punitive damages as 
compensatory damages in settlements.
9
 Instead, the under-punishment 
problem is best addressed at the state (not federal) level by making juries 
―tax aware,‖ instead of keeping them ―tax blind‖ regarding the fact and 
effect of deductibility in business-related cases.
10 
Tax-aware juries would 
be informed of business defendants‘ marginal tax rates, which would 
enable them to adjust the amount of punitive damages to impose the 
desired after-tax cost to the defendant.
11
 Parties seeking to settle would 
consequently bargain in the shadow of the (presumptively) larger award 
that would be made at trial if a verdict were reached. 
Unfortunately, while tax awareness would solve the under-punishment 
problem, it would do so at the cost of enlarging plaintiff recoveries. Many 
scholars and lawmakers view recoveries that go beyond full compensation 
as undeserved and unwarranted ―windfalls.‖12 If characterized correctly as 
windfalls,
13
 then these extracompensatory recoveries raise a number of 
 
 
TEX. L. REV. 819, 833–34 (1990) (same); Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall from 
Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992) [hereinafter Note, An Economic 
Analysis] (same); cf. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 18 (5th ed. 2005) (briefly 
discussing certain tax issues); New York State Bar Association Tax Section, The Deductibility of 
Punitive Damages, 93 TAX NOTES 1209 (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter NYSBA Report] (detailing 
Clinton administration proposals in 1999 and 2000); CONG. REC. 13065–66 (May 22, 2003) (noting 
that Conference Committee rejected Senate amendment to tax code that would deny deduction for 
punitive damages paid). Some commentators also challenge a proposal for nondeductibility, but their 
works are largely written in the vein of protecting business interests and they do not analyze the 
alternative strategy of tax awareness that is summarized here and developed in Gregg D. Polsky & Dan 
Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295 (2010). E.g., Brock D. Phillips, Note, The Tax 
Consequences of a Punitive Damages Award, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 909 (1980) (arguing that punitive 
damages ought to remain deductible); Robert W. Wood, Further Thoughts on Tax Treatment of 
Punitive Damages, 93 TAX NOTES 1502 (2001) [hereinafter Wood, Further Thoughts] (same); cf. Paul 
Feinberg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal Injury Actions, 42 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 339, 410 (1992) (arguing that plaintiffs should not be able to exclude punitive 
damages from income).  
 7. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION‘S FISCAL YEAR 
2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 95 (2010) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATIONS]. 
 8. See Polsky & Markel, supra note 6. 
 9. Id. As explained below, compensatory damages are deductible business expenses. 
 10. Id. See infra notes 33 and 38. 
 11. Polsky & Markel, supra note 6. 
 12. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives 
for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 562 (1991).  
 13. To be sure, there is a venerable school of thought that views punitive damages awards to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/2
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concerns. For example, an extension of windfalls to plaintiffs risks 
decreasing incentives for plaintiffs to take adequate precautions and 
increasing incentives to bring frivolous suits.
14
 Additionally, windfalls 
provide a kind of lottery gain that, ex ante, citizens would prefer to avoid 
because of their risk aversion. In other words, most people would prefer to 
have gains realized through lower taxes or more services as opposed to the 
unlikely prospect of a large windfall, even where these two options have 
the same risk-adjusted value.
 15
 Consequently, if there is a way of solving 
the under-punishment problem without needlessly enriching plaintiffs 
beyond the full scope of their losses, then that would be more desirable.
 16
  
This Article provides a strategy for overcoming that tradeoff. 
Essentially, this punishment/enrichment tradeoff could be mitigated 
through some basic reforms of punitive damages. Drawing on a recent 
reform proposal meant to disaggregate and implement the underlying and 
distinctive purposes of punitive damages,
17
 I identify how state and federal 
governments can avoid this tradeoff. These reforms are predicated on the 
idea that punitive damages should be disaggregated so as to accommodate 
three distinct purposes: (a) realizing the public‘s interest in developing an 
 
 
plaintiffs not as a windfall, but rather as a remedy that vindicates the injury to a plaintiff‘s dignity 
interests in a manner separate from the non-economic compensatory damages a plaintiff might receive. 
E.g., Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1023–29 
(2007) (arguing that punitive damages should be regarded as ―a form of state-sanctioned revenge‖) 
[hereinafter Sebok, From Myth to Theory]; Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and 
Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 269–74, 296–309 (2008) [hereinafter Geistfeld, Punitive 
Damages]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005); John 
C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL‘Y 3, 7 (2004); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and 
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1432 (1993); Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from 
Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 
434 (2008); see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 167 (1992). 
 14. See Polinsky & Che, supra note 12, at 562; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-737 (1996); Note, An 
Economic Analysis, supra note 6.  
 15. Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1564 (1999). 
 16. I am sympathetic to the claim that some plaintiffs might be undercompensated and that 
awarding punitive damages alleviates that concern to some extent. However, I think adherents to the 
victim-vindication view of punitive damages should find the normative proposals in the Article 
relatively compatible with their goals. I also recognize that there is a substantial risk that some 
plaintiffs would not pursue worthy claims without extracompensatory damages. For that reason, I 
agree that plaintiffs should be fully compensated for suffering wrongful losses and that defendants 
who are found liable should be separately responsible for attorneys‘ fees. That rationale, however, is as 
plausible outside the punitive damages context (i.e., applied to mere negligence or strict liability 
claims) as it is inside it. This issue is further addressed in Part I. 
 17. See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009) [hereinafter Markel, Retributive Damages]; Dan Markel, 
How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009) [hereinafter Markel, How 
Should Punitive Damages Work?].  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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intermediate civil sanction designed to promote retributive justice; (b) 
vindicating and compensating the injury to a victim‘s dignity interest not 
already covered by noneconomic damages; and (c) facilitating the pursuit 
of cost internalization (optimal deterrence) to the extent permitted after the 
Supreme Court‘s important and recent decision in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams.
18
  
Per the proposal, these three interests would no longer be conflated 
under the umbrella term of ―punitive damages.‖ Rather, the decision 
maker (whether jury or judge) would scrutinize each interest separately, 
and the remedy for a violation of each interest would fall under the labels 
of retributive, aggravated, and deterrence damages, respectively.
19
 
Although these reforms are not principally motivated and constructed to 
reduce the tax-related tradeoff between under-punishment correction and 
windfall augmentation under current doctrine, one of the incidental 
benefits of such reforms is that they would avoid such a tradeoff.  
At bottom, this Article sketches a pluralistic vision of what a reformed 
extracompensatory damages landscape might look like and how the tax 
rules should correspond. Contrary to those who would establish a 
sweeping rule of deductibility or nondeductibility for all forms of punitive 
damages, my view is that the appropriate tax treatment of civil damages 
should depend on the particular purpose that such damages are intended to 
achieve. Thus, in some respects, these recommendations can be seen as 
staking a middle path between those, like the President, touting the 
proposed rule of blanket nondeductibility for all punitive damages and 
those scholars endorsing the current rule permitting deductions for 
business-related punitive damages.
20 
The Article unfolds in three Parts. Part I furnishes some background 
about the taxation of punitive damages with respect to business 
defendants.
21
 I begin by summarizing the concern with the under-
 
 
 18. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). In Philip Morris, the Court held that the Due Process Clause forbids 
juries from including the harms to nonparties in calculating the amount of punitive damages that a 
defendant must pay. Id. at 353.  
 19. I explain the significance of these various terms in greater depth in Part II.  
 20. Compare, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 928–31 (1998) (advocating for the continued deductibility of 
punitive damages in the business-activity context), and Phillips, supra note 6, at 925–27 (same), with 
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 7 (urging the nondeductibility of punitive damages), Pace, supra 
note 6, at 881 (same), and Del Castillo, supra note 6 (same).  
 21. To be clear, the argument is limited only to suits involving defendants whose torts arise in a 
business context. The qualification matters because it is only with those defendants that the potential 
problems associated with different tax treatment of compensatory and punitive damages arise. 
Individual (nonbusiness) defendants are not able to deduct the costs of either compensatory or punitive 
damages and, thus, the whole incentive structure they face is substantially different than the one facing 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/2
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punishment problem and the proposed solution of tax awareness as a 
preferred method to deal with that problem under current law (rather than 
the nondeductibility rule endorsed by President Obama and other 
lawmakers and scholars). As mentioned before, regardless of the tactic 
used—nondeductibility or tax-aware juries and judges22—there is an 
ineluctable tradeoff between plaintiff enrichment on one hand and under-
punishing business defendants on the other.  
As demonstrated in Part I, while tax awareness best solves the under-
punishment problem,
23
 it does so at the cost of augmenting plaintiff 
windfalls. Fortunately, this problematic tradeoff is avoidable, provided 
that states are willing to reform their punitive damages laws. To that end, 
the next two Parts of the Article are normative and sketch a way out of this 
dilemma through some reforms of punitive damages law I recently 
proposed separately. These reforms are summarized in Part II.
24
  
Against the backdrop of this pluralistic framework, Part III examines 
how the tax law should be structured to complement this redesign of 
punitive damages law. In particular, I explain why a need for a 
differentiated taxation approach—i.e., one that allows for deductions of 
extracompensatory damages with gross ups in some contexts but not 
necessarily in others—might be valuable and what some of the relevant 
costs and benefits are with respect to these options. Perhaps surprisingly, I 
identify the very interesting vertical and horizontal federalism concerns 
associated with these taxation rules and offer a perspective on how to 
address them. The analysis here, I hope, will be of significance to the 
 
 
defendants whose torts arise in the course of a business. Thus, unless otherwise explicitly stated, all of 
the examples in this Article assume that the plaintiff‘s claim arose out of the defendant‘s business. 
Under current law, punitive damages paid that are unconnected to the defendant‘s business are 
nondeductible. Virtually all prior commentators and policy makers do not propose changing that 
practice; nor do I. 
 22. Throughout the rest of the Article, however, I have assumed that a jury would decide the 
amount of punitive damages. This is generally the case under current tort law, although judges do 
sometimes perform this function (for example, when a jury trial is waived or, in some jurisdictions, 
where the jury decides liability for punitive damages but the judge decides the amount of punitive 
damages). The tax-awareness discussion would apply equally to judges in those contexts, and I am not 
principally committed to who should make that tax-aware decision, only that whoever makes the 
decision should be tax aware. See Polsky & Markel, supra note 6. The expectation stated in that piece 
was that jurisdictions would permit experts to assist the juries or judges in developing the correct tax-
aware outcomes and thus help those decision makers overcome some of the difficulties taxpayers have 
thinking through even basic tax issues. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in 
Designing Taxes 9–10 (N.Y. Univ. Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-37, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1661322 (noting the kinds of problems plaguing 
taxpayers vis-à-vis the tax system). 
 23. See Polsky & Markel, supra note 6. 
 24. See Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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broader academic and policy-making community. The timing of this 
analysis is especially auspicious in light of the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Philip Morris,
25
 which reorients the constitutional landscape for 
punitive damages and, by doing so, invites the federal and state 
governments to rethink the allocation and taxation of punitive damages.  
I. CURRENT TAX LAW AND THE UNDER-PUNISHMENT PROBLEM 
A. The Nature of the Under-Punishment Problem 
Given the stated goals of punitive damages law in most American 
jurisdictions,
26
 punitive damages are principally and unsurprisingly 
awarded to punish defendants for torts committed with a malicious or 
reckless state of mind. In crafting an appropriate financial punishment for 
such misconduct, jurors are typically instructed to consider, among a 
number of other factors, the defendant‘s financial condition.27  
However, jurors are not currently informed of the fact that business-
related punitive damages are, like other business-related expenses, 
deductible for federal income tax purposes.
28
 Surprisingly, there are no 
reported cases discussing the tax awareness issue in the punitive damages 
context,
29
 and treatises and articles have largely ignored the issue,
30
 despite 
 
 
 25. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007).  
 26. Importantly, a small number of states view punitive damages as additional measures of 
compensation (and thus would be justified in not admitting evidence of defendants‘ wealth); the 
analysis is not intended to cover those states directly. Thus, for example, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
and Connecticut have in the past ascribed a ―private‖ and compensatory function to punitive damages 
awards in their states. See, e.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692 (Conn. 1930); Wise v. Daniel, 190 
N.W. 746 (Mich. 1922); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872). Additionally, four states (Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington) only allow punitive damages where expressly authorized 
by statute. See 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 6, § 2.2 (providing sources). By contrast, the vast majority of 
states use punitive damages as a jury-determined measure to achieve public state interests in 
retribution and deterrence. See id. §§ 1.3(C)–(D), 1.4(A); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 
S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008). 
 27. See generally TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) 
(describing as ―well-settled law‖ the notion that evidence related to financial condition of defendant is 
admissible in the context of determining punitive damages awards). For specific citations to each 
state‘s practices related to the admission of evidence related to wealth or financial position of the 
defendant, see Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1297, 1316 n.108 (2005); SCHLUETER, supra note 6, § 5.3.  
 28. Importantly, the juries are also not informed about the state or local tax effects. Just to be 
clear: throughout the piece, I will be referring to blended tax rates that take into account federal, state, 
and local taxes together. 
 29. See NYSBA Report, supra note 6.  
 30. I have found scant treatment of the issues. One treatise, SCHLUETER, supra note 6, adverts to 
the issues briefly, but without any substantial argument or citation to authorities. Id. § 18.2; see also id. 
§ 18.1(C). A few studies have referenced the issue in passing. The New York State Bar Association 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/2
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the fact that state and federal courts have generally allowed such 
augmentations in cases applying a range of antidiscrimination laws.
31
 
Some discussions with plaintiffs‘ lawyers indicate that they, too, have not 
focused on the issue of tax awareness.
32
 Accordingly, as a matter of 
practice, it appears that punitive damages jurors are not currently tax 
aware.
 
Indeed, the pervasiveness of tax blindness is a factual premise of 
the proposals to make punitive damages nondeductible because if jurors 
are in fact grossing up damages, then there is no under-punishment 
problem to which to respond. Moreover, even if some jurors are aware of 
the fact and effect of deductibility, they are not presented with evidence 
 
 
Report on the Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damages noted that the state laws have not addressed the 
issue of admissibility of the defendant‘s tax consequences to rebut the notion that allowing 
deductibility would unduly reduce the sting of a punitive damages award. NYSBA Report, supra note 
6. Likewise, Robert Wood has made the claim that if Congress made punitive damages awards 
nondeductible, the jury should be instructed on that fact; Wood implicitly assumes that juries currently 
gross up deductible awards. Wood, Further Thoughts, supra note 6, at 1501. However, there is no 
evidence to support this inference because it appears there are no cases where evidence is admitted 
regarding defendants‘ marginal tax rates. Likewise, another commentator implicitly assumes that 
jurors currently take into account tax deductibility of a punitive damages award in determining the size 
of the award to support his argument that to reduce the size of the plaintiff‘s windfall, awards should 
be nondeductible for defendants. Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 6. As I discuss below, 
making punitive damages nondeductible would reduce the size of the awards only if a jury is aware of 
the tax treatment of paying punitive damages. If juries are unaware, the size of the awards would be 
the same whether or not awards are deductible.  
 31. See generally Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination Remedies 
and Tax Gross Ups, 90 IOWA L. REV. 67, 91–99 (2004). The Third Circuit recently affirmed such an 
award under the Americans with Disabilities Act, noting that in crafting an appropriate remedy to 
restore the plaintiff to its ex ante economic position, these adverse tax consequences should be 
considered.
 
Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009). An earlier Tenth Circuit 
decision reached the same conclusion in a Title VII case, Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 
Co., 749 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1984), as have a number of other federal and state courts in applying 
various anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., O‘Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443 
(E.D. Pa. 2000); Arneson v. Sullivan, 958 F. Supp. 443, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also Blaney v. Int‘l 
Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 87 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2004) (applying 
Washington discrimination law); Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 839 A.2d 993 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003) 
(applying New Jersey discrimination law). 
 32. One nationally prominent plaintiffs‘ class action lawyer explained reluctance to press the tax 
argument based on the surmise that there was case law precluding admission of tax treatment evidence 
along the lines of the case law excluding admission of insurance coverage. I have seen no case law to 
that effect, but Professor Polsky and I address the underlying analogy to insurance coverage in the 
companion piece to this one, Polsky & Markel, supra note 6, at pt. I.B.5. Another prominent class 
action plaintiffs‘ lawyer thought we were spot on in identifying the oversight of the plaintiffs‘ bar. In 
any event, Professor Polsky and I would welcome more empirical information one way or the other. 
The best evidence of this neglect, which admittedly only allows a weakened inference, is that there is 
virtually no discussion of the matter in the published cases or scholarship. See also Lawrence Zelenak, 
Of Punitive Damages, Tax Deductions, and Tax-Aware Juries: A Response to Polsky and Markel, 96 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61, 68 (2010) (suggesting that the failure of plaintiffs‘ lawyers to make juries tax 
aware is a puzzle that ―should be high on the research agenda of anthropologists of the legal 
profession‖). 
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such as the marginal tax rate of the defendant, so they never can make 
truly tax-aware decisions.
33 
As a result, when punitive damages are deductible as business 
expenses, as they are now to business defendants, the true cost of a 
punitive damages award is typically and substantially less than the 
nominal amount of the award. As a result, business defendants in punitive 
damages cases are typically under-punished relative to the jury‘s 
intentions where the jury is making a determination based on the 
defendant‘s wealth.34  
To illustrate, assume that a jury determines that a defendant‘s net worth 
is $1,000,000 and decides that the defendant should pay 10% of its net 
worth in order to impose an appropriate punishment. If the jury is not 
aware of the fact that the defendant is able to deduct the punitive damages 
award, it would render an award of $100,000. However, if the defendant‘s 
marginal tax rate is 40%, then the after-tax cost of a deductible punitive 
damages award levied is only $60,000, which is $40,000 less than what 
the jury had intended.
35
 Accordingly, assuming the defendant has 
$100,000 of taxable income to offset, the after-tax cost to the defendant is 
only $60,000.
36
 Under these facts, the under-punishment argument is 
forceful because the jury‘s intended punishment is blunted by the 
unforeseen tax deduction.  
 
 
 33. The premise of tax blindness also seems reasonable given that most of the students (and law 
professors) I spoke with about this were surprised to learn that punitive damages incurred in 
connection with a business are deductible. Cf. Comm‘rs of Inland Revenue v. Alexander von Glehn & 
Co., [1920] 2 K.B. 553 at 571 (Eng.) (stating that the answer to the question of whether a defendant 
can deduct fines from his business income is an ―obvious‖ no).  
 34. The argument for admitting marginal tax rates is limited to those penalties that are wealth-
adjusted rather than net income–adjusted, because net income is already a ―tax-informed‖ 
measurement. So, to be clear, I am in favor of ―universal‖ tax awareness by juries. Thus, for example, 
if juries, in crafting an award, are permitted or required to take into account the amount of profits 
generated by an activity or during a specific period, these profits should be expressed in after-tax 
terms.  
 35. Forty percent is roughly the top effective marginal federal, state, and local income tax rate 
that could currently apply to a given defendant. Tax scholarship typically uses this figure in examples. 
See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of Pre-Tax Profit, 26 VA. 
TAX REV. 821, 833 (2007). 
 36. This is similar to the ―matching contribution‖ effect resulting from the charitable contribution 
deduction. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776–77 (2007) (showing that a $1,000 deductible contribution costs a 35% 
marginal tax bracket donor only $650, with the remaining $350 effectively paid by the government). 
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B. Overcoming Under-Punishment 
The companion article I wrote with Professor Polsky considers this 
problem and its potential solutions under current law in depth.
37
 I 
summarize those findings here to lay the foundation for showing why the 
tradeoff between punishment and plaintiff enrichment cannot be overcome 
under existing structures of tort law, and why reforms to punitive damages 
are needed for this reason, among others.  
1. Two Tactics: Nondeductibility vs. Tax Awareness 
To begin with, the under-punishment concern arises as a result of the 
assumption that the typical jury‘s understanding of federal tax law is 
inconsistent with how the tax law actually operates.
38
 This inconsistency 
could be resolved in two independent ways. One option would be to 
change federal tax law by making punitive damages nondeductible in all 
cases. This is the reform touted by President Obama and others.
39
 While 
the under-punishment effect is problematic, this proposed solution does 
not help.  
Instead, the alternative approach of tax awareness, which has been 
hitherto ignored in this context, though not all others,
40
 ought to be 
 
 
 37. Polsky & Markel, supra note 6. 
 38. The assumption that a jury is tax-blind is made for a few reasons. This ―tax blindness‖ will 
be true when jurors, in determining the amount of an award, either: (a) do not think about the tax 
consequences of paying punitive damages at all; or (b) do think about the tax consequences of paying 
punitive damages but incorrectly assume that punitive damages are nondeductible in all instances. 
Jurors who do think about taxes may assume nondeductibility for a number of reasons. They may 
simply assume that punitive payments would be nondeductible. Alternatively, jurors may be aware that 
statutory fines and penalties are nondeductible, just like kickbacks and bribes. See I.R.C. § 162(c)(3), 
(f) (2006). As a result, they may assume that, by analogy, punitive damages are as well. Finally, some 
jurors may infer nondeductibility from the fact that they, under current practices, are not given 
information about the defendant‘s marginal tax rate, a fact which would be necessary to calculate a 
proper gross up. Hypothetically, someone could be utterly ignorant of the prevailing tax effects of 
punitive damages and yet guess that such damages would be deductible. Most people, however, are not 
likely to know that punitive damages can be paid with pre-tax dollars by some defendants but not 
others.  
 39. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493, 497–98 (1980) (holding that 
the impact of § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows physically injured plaintiffs to 
exclude compensatory damages from gross income, must be considered by courts in determining an 
award under the Federal Employers‘ Liability Act (FELA)); Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 
158, 161 (6th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff‘s tax consequences may be introduced under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act); Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff‘s tax consequences may be 
introduced in claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 
(2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the tax-awareness rule in Liepelt for FELA actions applies at least to all 
federal law claims for future lost wages).  
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adopted. Under current tort law and practice, jurors are effectively ―tax 
blind‖ regarding the fact and effect of deductibility in business-related 
cases. If jurors were actually made tax aware, they would be able to adjust 
or gross up a punitive damages award to reflect the fact of deductibility. 
Indeed, once properly grossed up, a punitive damages award would inflict 
the jury‘s desired ―sting,‖ ensuring that their intended financial sanction is 
in fact borne by the defendant. By implication, once juries are tax aware, 
the under-punishment argument in favor of making punitive damages 
nondeductible dissolves. Like net worth evidence and other similar 
evidence relating to the defendant‘s financial condition, evidence 
regarding the fact and effect of deductibility is relevant in calculating the 
size of an appropriate punitive damages award.
41 
To illustrate, a tax-aware jury in the scenario presented in Part I.A 
would issue a $167,000 punitive damages award to impose an after-tax 
penalty on the defendant in the amount of $100,000.
42
 This grossed-up 
award of $167,000 would result in an after-tax cost of $100,000 ($167,000 
x .60), which is 10% of the defendant‘s net worth, consistent with the 
jury‘s intentions. More generally, the amount of a given intended penalty 
would be grossed up by dividing the intended penalty amount by (1-t), 
where t is the defendant‘s marginal tax rate.43  
2. An Overview of the Case for Tax Awareness 
Tax awareness is preferable for several reasons. First, as explained 
below, the choice between these two approaches depends largely on how 
easily defendants could circumvent a rule of nondeductibility through 
settlements that disguise punitive damages as compensatory damages, 
 
 
 41. For purposes of this Article, I adopt, without arguing, the conventional assumption that 
business defendants are permissibly punished in a way similar to individuals and that wealth-adjusted 
penalties are reasonably imposed on business entities. (A normative justification for this claim is 
offered in Dan Markel Punishing Entities (Civilly) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).) To 
be sure, some scholars reject the notion that businesses (or at least, public corporations) can sensibly 
be punished even though they think they can be deterred. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, 
at 948–54. Thus, it is possible that such scholars will view the resulting ―under-punishment‖ as a good 
thing if it turns out that the amount of punitive damages awarded is sufficient but not excessive in 
relation to the optimal deterrence signal. 
 42. $167,000 in pre-tax dollars is necessary to create $100,000 post-tax dollars on the assumption 
of the application of a 40% marginal tax rate. Except in a few examples later on where greater 
specificity is required, I have rounded up to the closest thousand dollars. 
 43. It might appear that this math could be difficult for a lay jury to perform correctly. As alluded 
to earlier, I am relatively indifferent regarding whether the jury or the judge is the fact finder vis-à-vis 
the marginal tax rate and the calculation of the gross up. For simplicity‘s sake, I will generally refer to 
jury tax awareness, but the discussion below applies equally to judges if they are the relevant fact 
finder.  
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which would remain deductible under either approach.
44
 It turns out that 
circumvention is relatively easy in most cases. Moreover, tax awareness 
furnishes a way for states to better implement their own visions for tort 
law. This is good both as a matter of respecting states‘ rights under a 
federal constitution, as well as providing some regulatory diversity in the 
ambit of punitive damages, which itself allows for states to experiment 
and learn from each other. A federal tax rule of nondeductibility 
undermines those values. 
a. The Circumvention Problem 
Imagine two possible scenarios, one where the IRS can enforce the rule 
of nondeductibility perfectly and one where it cannot. In the former 
scenario, this would mean that the IRS would readily be able to determine 
the value of the punitive damages portions of settlements. The IRS could 
then deny deductions for that portion of the defendant‘s settlement 
payments.  
If the IRS were able to perfectly enforce a rule of nondeductibility, the 
defendant would be indifferent between a rule of nondeductibility and a 
tax-aware jury because the defendant would pay the same after-tax cost. 
The parties who would care more about the shift to a rule of 
nondeductibility would be the federal government, which benefits from a 
perfectly enforced nondeductibility rule, and the plaintiff, who benefits 
from a tax-aware jury.
45
  
Who should get that gain? Well, given the competition between the 
government and the plaintiff for the extra money paid by the defendant, 
there is no compelling reason to enlarge the plaintiff‘s windfall by 
choosing the tax-awareness solution.
46
 After all, as long as sufficient 
 
 
 44. I do not believe that a rule of nondeductibility for compensatory damages would seriously be 
entertained by Congress. Such a rule would result in significant overdeterrence because ex ante 
precautionary measures would be deductible while compensatory damages would not. While current 
punitive damages law is not concerned with the risk of overdeterrence, nonpunitive damages tort law 
is concerned with this risk. In any event, none of the prior proposals for nondeductibility have 
suggested making compensatory damages nondeductible, and making compensatory damages 
nondeductible would have significant rippling effects traveling far beyond the world of punitive 
damages. Accordingly, I assume throughout that the taxation of compensatory damages would remain 
unchanged. But cf. Alfred F. Conard, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections on 
Wealth Transfers from the Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283 (1993) (exploring the argument that 
even compensatory damages should be nondeductible). 
 45. The rationales for these conclusions are elaborated at length in Polsky and Markel, supra 
note 6, at pt. II. 
 46. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 6, at 1917 (discussing social disadvantages of 
windfalls associated with plaintiffs‘ recoveries of punitive damages). 
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incentives exist under the current tax-blind rule for plaintiffs to prosecute 
worthy punitive damages cases, the federal government could, by making 
punitive damages nondeductible, simultaneously correct under-
punishment while also generating additional tax revenues without any 
resulting deadweight loss to society.
47
  
While elegant and attractive under an assumption of perfect 
enforcement, the nondeductibility rule is not a practical option once the 
assumption of perfect enforcement is relaxed. Indeed, under that far more 
likely scenario, it is likely that circumvention of a nondeductibility rule 
would be easy in the vast majority of cases where plaintiffs seek punitive 
damages as a remedy. As explained in greater depth in my companion 
piece with Professor Polsky, there are a number of conceptual and 
practical impediments to the IRS‘s ability to enforce a rule of 
nondeductibility.
48 
Indeed, under a rule of nondeductibility, defendants would be able to 
participate in the tax gains from circumvention in the form of lower after-
tax settlement costs.
49
 Settlement agreements routinely expressly allocate 
the entire amount to compensatory damages.
50
 Given the mutually self-
serving nature of these allocations, they should not be assumed to reflect 
the true nature of the plaintiff‘s claims. However, courts have given these 
self-serving, agreed-upon allocations some degree of weight.
51
 These 
courts neglect to consider the fact that, no matter how adversarial the 
parties are throughout most of the litigation, at the point of settlement, the 
 
 
 47. Kades, supra note 15, at 1564. 
 48. Polsky & Markel, supra note 6, at pt. II. 
 49. See Bagley v. Comm‘r, 121 F.3d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1997) (―It will almost never be to a 
defendant's advantage to allocate part of a lump-sum settlement to punitive damages, and it will often 
be disadvantageous. Often, insurance policies will not cover such awards, and punitive-damage awards 
result in worse publicity than compensatory awards. Most plaintiffs will not want specific allocations 
to punitive damages in their settlement agreements, because punitive damages are taxable.‖); ROBERT 
W. WOOD, 522-3D TAX MANAGEMENT: TAX ASPECTS OF SETTLEMENTS & JUDGMENTS, at A-33 
(2006) (noting that, even leaving aside tax considerations, ―it would be highly atypical for a settlement 
agreement to acknowledge that any portion of the settlement was being paid on account of punitive 
damages,‖ and that ―[v]irtually no defendant would agree to such a characterization‖). 
 50. See WOOD, supra note 49, at A-33; see also Bagley, 121 F.3d at 396 n.7 (noting that the 
defendant‘s attorney, ―an experienced Iowa litigator, told the Tax Court that he could recall no 
settlement with which he had been involved that specifically allocated a certain amount to punitive 
damages in the settlement agreement‖). 
 51. See, e.g., McKay v. Comm‘r, 102 T.C. 465, 482 (1994), vacated on other grounds, 84 F.3d 
433 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that an express allocation in a settlement agreement is the ―most important 
factor‖ in allocating pretrial settlements); Byrne v. Comm‘r, 90 T.C. 1000 (1988) (same); see also 
I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200146008, at 5 (Nov. 11, 2001) (acknowledgement by the IRS that 
courts ―have tended to uphold the characterization or allocations in a settlement agreement where the 
record indicates there was a negotiated and bona fide settlement, arrived at in an adversarial 
proceeding at arm's length and in good faith‖). 
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parties‘ interests in reducing the tax burdens of the settlement are perfectly 
aligned.
52
 As a result, to challenge a defendant‘s self-serving allocation, 
the IRS would be forced to relitigate the plaintiff‘s underlying claims long 
after the case was settled and without the benefit of a financially interested 
plaintiff. Thus, even if the IRS were somehow able to find good 
settlements to challenge, these pragmatic evidentiary problems would 
make it very difficult for the IRS to be successful in winning these 
challenges.  
An extremely large percentage of tort cases already settle under current 
law,
53
 and a rule of nondeductibility should serve only to increase the 
settlement rate.
54
 Accordingly, circumvention through disguised 
settlements would be the norm, rather than the exception, under a rule of 
nondeductibility.
55
  
The effect of this circumvention would result in precisely the same 
under-punishment effect that nondeductibility is intended to correct. 
Accordingly, if circumvention is in fact relatively easy, the tax-awareness 
approach (which is not subject to circumvention) is the preferred solution 
to the under-punishment problem.  
On the other hand, the alternative solution to the under-punishment 
problem—making jurors tax aware—is not easily circumvented through 
settlement. Gross ups, in addition to increasing jury verdicts, would 
increase settlement values because litigants determine these values in the 
shadow of what a jury would be expected to award. Thus, defendants 
 
 
 52. Not all courts fall victim to this problem. See, e.g., Bagley, 121 F.3d at 396 (noting that 
―when the time comes to settle a case, no matter how adversarial the proceedings have been to that 
point, the parties will almost always be in agreement that no part of a settlement agreement should be 
explicitly allocated to punitive damages‖). 
 53. See GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 40 (2004) 
(observing that only 3% of all torts suits reach a jury verdict and that settlements or dismissal resolves 
the rest of claims). 
 54. See Polsky & Markel, supra note 6, at pt. II.C.2. 
 55. That said, in some cases, circumvention of the nondeductibility rule might not be possible. 
For example, if the ―settlement gap‖ (i.e., the gap between what the plaintiff thinks the case is worth 
and what the defendant thinks the case is worth) is large enough, the gains from circumvention would 
not be large enough to induce litigants to settle. Likewise, if the plaintiff has a strong enough desire to 
―have her day in court,‖ the gains from circumvention might not be large enough to sway the plaintiff. 
In addition, if the maximum amount of compensatory damages can be easily ascertained, putting at 
least a minimum value on the punitive damages portion of a settlement would be easy. Thus, for 
example, if a plaintiff is defrauded out of $10,000, and the case settles for $100,000, it would be easy 
for the IRS to assert that at least $90,000 of the settlement is attributable to punitive damages 
(assuming that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would have recovered attorney‘s fees and 
ignoring the possibility of prejudgment interest). In personal injury cases, however, the amount of 
compensatory damages is usually not easy to ascertain primarily because pain and suffering awards are 
very difficult to predict, but also because the amount of lost wages and future medical costs are often 
the subject of much dispute. 
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could not avoid any part of the under-punishment correction resulting 
from gross ups simply by settling before trial. 
Assuming circumvention is relatively easy (as Polsky and I argued), 
the critical issue is whether reducing a given dollar amount of under-
punishment is worth giving the same dollar amount of added windfall. If 
so, then one can conclude that (i) a rule of nondeductibility is an 
improvement over current law, but (ii) a rule of tax awareness with gross 
ups is even better. If not, then the proper inference is that current law 
should be unchanged because the cost of either solution to the under-
punishment problem (i.e., augmented plaintiff windfalls) would exceed the 
benefit (reduced under-punishments). Accordingly, a rule of 
nondeductibility is never the optimal rule. 
b. Federalism and Regulatory Diversity 
In addition to the concerns about circumvention, federalism and 
regulatory diversity concerns also support choosing the tax-awareness 
approach. First, the goal of under-punishment reduction is to further the 
state‘s interests in effectively punishing egregious acts committed within 
its borders. This is a traditional state law concern, and there is no practical 
or legal impediment to states fixing the under-punishment problem on 
their own through tax awareness. It can therefore be argued that the federal 
government ought to give states the option to solve the problem 
themselves by maintaining the current tax rule of deductibility. After all, a 
rule of nondeductibility would foreclose the optimal state-law solution (tax 
awareness) by adopting the second-best solution, as accompanied by the 
aforementioned problems resulting from imperfect enforcement of the 
under-punishment problem. Put somewhat differently, the premise behind 
nondeductibility proposals is that federal tax law should get out of the way 
of state tort law. However, the proposals would themselves actually get in 
the way of state tort law by preempting the optimal correction to the very 
problem (i.e., under-punishment) that stimulated the proposals.  
Second, as Professor Polsky and I have shown elsewhere and as I 
summarize below, under-punishment correction, whether accomplished 
through tax awareness or nondeductibility, inevitably comes with certain 
costs. For example, both proposals would increase plaintiff windfalls and 
would create administrative burdens. These costs must be weighed against 
the benefits associated with correcting under-punishment. A federal tax 
rule of nondeductibility would take away the ability of states to perform 
this cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, if punitive damages remained 
deductible, states could undertake such an analysis in deciding whether to 
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implement a rule of tax awareness. States have undertaken and will 
continue to undertake similar cost-benefit analyses in designing and 
reforming their punitive damages regimes.
56
  
In addition, the administrative costs of a rule of nondeductibility would 
be borne by the federal government as a result of having to police the rule, 
while the benefit of under-punishment correction would inure to the state. 
Under a tax-awareness solution, this mismatch of benefits and 
administrative burdens does not occur because the administrative costs of 
implementing a rule of tax awareness are borne entirely by the state.  
Finally, a state‘s ―punitive‖ or extracompensatory damages regime 
might not be motivated by concerns of punishment.
57
 For example, the 
regime might be intended simply to compensate the plaintiff for intangible 
injuries or to effect optimal cost internalization. In those cases, there is no 
under-punishment problem to be solved, and the current rule of 
deductibility, combined with juror tax blindness, is generally adequate. If 
the current rule of deductibility were retained, states could easily opt out 
of a rule of tax awareness where appropriate. The states would be in a far 
better position to evaluate their own tort laws and then apply a rule of tax 
awareness as they see fit. Using a nondeductibility rule assumes that states 
want to use extracompensatory damages strictly to punish, which deprives 
them of the choice to fashion their rules as they see fit. 
In short, the state-law solution of tax awareness is an appropriately 
flexible solution to the under-punishment problem. It also puts the costs of 
under-punishment correction squarely on the state, whose interests are 
furthered by the correction. By contrast, the frequently proposed federal 
solution of nondeductibility is far more blunt an instrument and creates a 
mismatch between the governmental entity that receives the benefit and 
the one that bears the administrative costs. 
3. Windfalls and the Dark Side of Tax Awareness 
As discussed above, tax awareness is the better solution. Nonetheless, 
tax awareness is not without its potential difficulties or objections. There 
 
 
 56. Cf. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―The 
Court, I am convinced, unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the 
States‘ domain, and does so in the face of reform measures recently adopted or currently under 
consideration in legislative arenas.‖). Justice Ginsburg‘s federalism concerns cannot be dismissed 
simply as liberal politics; Chief Justice Rehnquist joined her dissent. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., supra note 26; see also Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts: The Case of 
Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 333 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (providing several 
nonpunitive rationales for punitive damages). 
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are some administrative costs associated with having the jury or the court 
determine the marginal tax rates and apply the appropriate gross up.
58
 
Perhaps most pressing is this: while a rule of tax awareness would best 
solve the under-punishment problem, it does so at the cost of increasing 
what a variety of scholars believe to be ―windfall‖ gains to plaintiffs.59 As 
mentioned in the Introduction, such windfall gains raise several kinds of 
concerns related to fairness and efficiency. Some economists argue that 
extending windfalls to plaintiffs risks decreasing incentives for plaintiffs 
to take adequate precautions and increasing incentives to bring frivolous 
suits.
60
  
Perhaps those concerns seem somewhat speculative. After all, lawyers 
would not typically want to invest their time in frivolous suits for both 
economic and noneconomic reasons. And plaintiffs typically want to avoid 
being tort victims (especially subject to the kind of torts leading to 
punitive damages), so the question would be whether there are some 
scenarios where they accept more marginal risk on the assumption that 
there could be a punitive damages payoff.  
Nonetheless, damages that go beyond full recovery do provide a 
windfall, and windfalls provide a kind of lottery gain that, ex ante, most 
citizens would probably prefer to avoid if it could alternatively be enjoyed 
more certainly through lower taxes or more services.
61
  
Moreover, the gross up of punitive damages under a tax-awareness rule 
would be a good response for undercompensation of plaintiffs more 
generally. For even if one believes that plaintiffs are systematically 
undercompensated under current tort law because of litigation costs, this 
problem is best resolved directly and comprehensively, not through 
punitive damages gross ups because such punitive damages are relatively 
uncommon.
62
 Indeed, gross ups would only mitigate the 
undercompensation problem in an even smaller subset of cases: those 
punitive damages cases arising out of the defendant‘s business. In all other 
 
 
 58. In the companion article, Professor Polsky and I consider a range of other objections and find 
them unpersuasive upon scrutiny. See Polsky & Markel, supra note 6, at pt. III. 
 59. Congressional legislative history suggests that this is Congress‘s view also. H.R. REP. NO. 
104-737 (1996); see also Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 6. 
 60. See Polinsky & Che, supra note 12, at 562; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-737 (1996); Note, An 
Economic Analysis, supra note 6.  
 61. Kades, supra note 15, at 1564. 
 62. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole L. Waters & Martin T. Wells, The 
Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 22–24), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412864 
(reporting findings that challenge the claim that punitive damages are unduly high, frequent, or 
erratic). 
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punitive damages cases, the plaintiff‘s recovery would be unaffected. 
Finally, since the amount of gross ups depends on the defendant‘s 
marginal tax rate, the amount of undercompensation relief would vary 
from plaintiff to plaintiff, even in cases arising out of the defendant‘s 
business.  
4. An Ineliminable Tradeoff? 
Thus, at bottom, a tradeoff persists under current law: every dollar paid 
from the defendant (which thereby addresses the under-punishment 
problem) ends up going to the plaintiff (and thereby creates recoveries that 
could plausibly be characterized as windfalls). Unfortunately, this tradeoff 
applies even if the government were to impose a ―windfall profits‖ tax on 
plaintiffs who receive punitive damages recoveries to ameliorate this 
unintended byproduct of tax awareness. Alternatively, a split-recovery 
scheme, where the state takes a portion of the recovery of punitive 
damages, might be considered.
63
 Such efforts by the state to offset punitive 
damage recoveries would theoretically reduce plaintiff windfalls. 
However, like a rule of nondeductibility, these efforts would be easily 
circumvented through settlement in most cases. Circumvention would be 
accomplished through settlements that disguise punitive damages as 
compensatory damages, which would not be subject to the windfall profits 
tax. Gains from circumventing the windfall profits tax would be shared 
with the defendant because the defendant must agree to settle to achieve 
the gains.
64
 Thus, while a windfall profits tax would in fact reduce the 
windfall of the plaintiff, it would at the same time reduce the defendant‘s 
punishment to below that which a jury would have awarded.  
In other words, the tax would have similar effects to those resulting 
from a rule of nondeductibility. This is an example of the Coase-like tax 
maxim that it does not matter which party to a transaction is the nominal 
beneficiary of a tax benefit (or the nominal victim of a tax burden) because 
the benefit (or burden) can be shifted through bargaining.
65
 Here, part of 
the benefit from avoiding the excise tax would be shifted through 
bargaining from the plaintiff (the nominal beneficiary) to the defendant in 
the form of lower settlement costs. As a result, like a rule of 
 
 
 63. A few states have adopted such split-recovery schemes. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 390 n.152 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, 
Punitive Damages]. 
 64. Because defendants must agree to disguise the damages as compensatory damages, they will 
be able to bargain with the plaintiffs for a smaller overall payment. 
 65. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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nondeductibility, an excise tax on plaintiffs is not advisable if one believes 
that a dollar of under-punishment correction is worth a dollar of windfall 
augmentation.
66
  
As explained in the companion article, those policies would simply 
incentivize cooperation between plaintiffs and defendants, but it would do 
so at costs that are lower for the defendant than when the defendant is 
either subject to a tax-aware jury or bargains in the shadow of a tax-aware 
jury.
67
 In other words, if you tax the plaintiff‘s receipt of punitive damages 
or force the defendant to pay something like half the punitive damages to 
the government, you encourage the parties to settle their claims quietly as 
compensation, thereby depriving the government of the recovery these 
measures are intended to achieve, and all the while allowing the defendant 
to settle at a lower price than it would have faced under a tax-awareness 
regime.
68 
While this tradeoff might be lamented, it is unavoidable under current 
punitive damages doctrine because of the way in which parties currently 
have close to unfettered discretion to settle, even in cases affecting public 
health and safety. Moreover, because punitive damages doctrine is focused 
on the defendant‘s culpable wrongdoing, courts tend not to concern 
themselves too much about enriching plaintiffs. Thus, for example, a 
victim injured by a wealthy and malicious tortfeasor will, all else being 
equal, receive a larger windfall than that received by a poor and malicious 
tortfeasor‘s victim. Yet, this possibility has not prevented the fact of the 
tortfeasor‘s wealth from being introduced to the jury. Likewise, the 
prospect of augmented plaintiffs‘ windfalls would not be a satisfactory 
basis to preclude the fact of deductibility from being admitted into 
evidence so as to give the jury the requisite tools to impose a financial 
penalty on the defendant that it deems appropriate.
69
  
As I argue in the following Parts, the tradeoff can be overcome if states 
are willing to undertake some basic reforms to their punitive damages 
schemes. These reforms are not designed solely with the objective of 
alleviating this tradeoff resulting from the current tax laws. They can be 
 
 
 66. As I have previously discussed, if one believes that a dollar of under-punishment correction 
is not worth a dollar of windfall augmentation, then current law (i.e., deductibility without tax 
awareness) should simply be left in place.  
 67. Polsky & Markel, supra note 6, at pt. II. 
 68. Of course, while increased settlement facilitates circumvention of the desired tax result, it 
will also marginally reduce the cost of litigation to society, so we‘d need to find out if there‘s a 
substantial gain to society from reduced litigation costs that are borne by the public. 
 69. Indeed, awards of punitive damages, even when augmented, would still be subject to judicial 
review for compliance with constitutional legal norms. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] OVERCOMING TRADEOFFS 629 
 
 
 
 
defended, in other words, on a number of other grounds (and, in fact, have 
been so defended).
70
 Nonetheless, these same reforms would also help 
states overcome the tradeoff I have identified here in the tax context.  
II. RETHINKING EXTRACOMPENSATORY DAMAGES: A NORMATIVE VISION 
The preceding Part exposed a tax-driven tension between the 
overenrichment of plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the ―correct‖ 
punishment for defendants, on the other hand, under prevailing tort 
procedures commonly found throughout the country. This tradeoff is 
largely inevitable given the way punitive damages law engrafts, for the 
most part, public-law values (e.g., retribution and complete deterrence) 
upon a private tort law system.  
The next two Parts, however, consider how punitive damages should be 
taxed if redesigning the structure of punitive damages law at the state 
level. Responding to various criticisms that punitive damages law and 
practice are muddled, unpredictable, unfair, and ineffective,
71
 I have 
previously tried to carefully reconstruct the punitive damages landscape, 
first, by changing the name to extracompensatory damages, and, second, 
by disaggregating the various purposes such remedies might serve—while 
still feasibly situating these remedies within the constitutional constraints 
articulated by the Supreme Court.
72
 This Part is designed to sketch in brief 
both the motivation and the structure of this redesigned civil damages 
regime.
73
 Following this, Part III will discuss the tax rules that should 
apply to the reformed landscape. Before we head down that path, a little 
background on punitive damages theory is necessary. 
A. Recent Normative Theories of Punitive Damages 
The complex and rapidly evolving nature of punitive damages law has 
attracted the attention of scholars from a variety of disciplines.
74
 In terms 
 
 
 70. See Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. 
 71. E.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624 (2008) (―American punitive 
damages have been the target of audible criticism in recent decades‖); Developments in the Law—The 
Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1784–88 (2000) (providing examples of and 
citations to such critiques). 
 72. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 73. In so doing, this Part draws upon and gently revises aspects of my work, sources cited supra 
note 17, which itself tries to learn from the achievements and mistakes of earlier scholarly work trying 
to reconfigure a rational policy for punitive damages. 
 74. See, e.g., Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17 at 242–43 nn.4–9 (providing citations 
to scholars of various disciplines interested in studying punitive damages law and practice). 
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of normative approaches to punitive damages, numerous scholars, 
including Professors Polinsky and Shavell, think that punitive damages 
should focus on advancing the goal of optimal deterrence (or what I also 
call, hereafter, ―cost internalization‖ or ―deterrence‖).75 Under this 
framework, and contrary to current doctrine, a defendant‘s culpability or 
state of mind is immaterial to her obligation to pay for the tortious harms 
that she causes.
76
 Instead, what matters is whether any likelihood exists 
that the defendant would evade paying compensation for the harms she 
caused. If there is such a possibility, then the amount of damages should 
be calibrated accordingly.
77
 A small number of judges have endorsed the 
basic insight undergirding this approach,
78
 but, for the most part, it is not a 
widely embraced strategy by courts or juries.
79
 Moreover, as Professor 
Sharkey points out, a total cost-internalization approach focused on 
extracting money from the defendant would not necessarily ensure 
compensation to victims for all their losses since, theoretically, the state 
might apply those payments to reducing future risk of harm rather than 
compensating past victims.
80
  
 
 
 75. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 897–98. A few sundry points about deterrence 
here: First, I recognize that by conflating deterrence with optimal deterrence (or cost internalization), I 
am implicitly obscuring the work of some economists who view this law through the prism of 
complete deterrence. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of 
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (arguing that the optimal-deterrence model should be used in 
limited cases and that complete deterrence should be the goal in most situations). The rationale for 
making this choice is partially explained at infra note 108. Second, the discussion in the text about 
optimal deterrence is normative; it doesn‘t undermine the earlier descriptive claim that the kind of 
deterrence emphasized by the Supreme Court in its case law is complete deterrence, not optimal 
deterrence. Third, while I distinguish between optimal and complete deterrence, I note that other 
scholars have used different terms to mark the distinction. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68–69 (1970) (distinguishing between general 
(permissive) deterrence and specific (prohibitory) deterrence); Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524–31 (1984).  
 76. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 887–96.  
 77. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 887 (―[I]f a defendant can sometimes escape 
liability for the harm for which he is responsible, the proper magnitude of damages is the harm the 
defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the probability of his escaping liability.‖ 
(emphasis omitted)). But see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle 
and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999) (providing critique of the multiplier principle); 
Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON & ORG. 388 
(2005) (registering skepticism to use of the multiplier approach in the context of civil damages); 
Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 63, at 368–70 (identifying problems with the use of a strict 
punitive damages multiplier, such as the failure to include cases involving ―diffuse‖ harms).  
 78. See Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 63 , at 372 n.71 (collecting cases). 
 79. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
237, 250 (2000) (finding that people who were asked neither think in terms of optimal deterrence nor 
find much value in it). 
 80. See Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 63, at 390–91.  
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In addition to the cost-internalization approach, some other scholars 
analyze and seek to justify the practice of punitive damages in terms of 
how such a remedy empowers individual victims, and thus serves to 
vindicate a victim‘s dignity and autonomy interests that may have been 
injured or insulted by the defendant‘s misconduct.81 Since these victim-
vindication approaches effectively legitimize the utilization of enhanced 
awards to repair the injury that the defendant‘s misconduct caused to the 
plaintiff‘s dignity, they are more precisely labeled ―aggravated‖ damages, 
as they are sometimes called in various jurisdictions.
82
 The notion is that 
these damages repair an injury not recognized by the noneconomic aspects 
of modern compensatory damages.
83
  
Some victim-vindication theorists have defended large parts of current 
punitive damages common law on the grounds that these practices serve as 
vehicles by which victims or their allies can persuade juries to avenge 
victims‘ interests through ad hoc, and therefore unpredictable, awards of 
money damages.
84
 Indeed, for some social justice tort theorists, common 
law jury-driven punitive damages practices serve as a means for ordinary 
people to fight malfeasant entities and their lobbyists seeking business-
friendly tort reform.
85
  
 
 
 81. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13. 
 82. See Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a 
Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 763 (1989) (―Where there is already injury in place that the law 
recognizes as damages, this added ‗insult‘ to injury would count more accurately as ‗aggravated,‘ than 
as punitive, damages.‖).  
 83. Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of 
Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 205 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, What 
Did Punitive Damages Do?] (―If punitive damages served a compensatory function [in early cases], it 
would have been for a category of injury that is still not considered compensable by contemporary tort 
law, namely the injury of insult that wounds or dishonors.‖). 
 84. See, e.g., Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. 
REV. 1115, 1119 (defending the role of juries in ―protect[ing] us from rule by legal economists‖ 
through ―relatively unconstrained punitive awards‖). Professors Galanter and Luban also endorse (at 
least implicitly) a jury imposing punitive damages against a defendant in a single case for all the harm 
that the defendant‘s misconduct caused persons in similar situations. See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, 
supra note 13, at 1436–38 (providing examples of ―expressive defeat‖ of defendants through punitive 
damages). They also think that judges should extend ―great deference‖ to jury determinations because 
of juries‘ special competence in articulating ―the community‘s ‗message‘ through the medium of 
damages.‖ Id. at 1439. But see infra Part II.B (describing the proposed limitations on jury decision 
making). Theoretically, cost-internalization proponents should support the payment of aggravated 
damages as a way to force defendants to pay for the full scope of harm they have caused, but the 
textures of the rationales and implications of these approaches to civil damages are quite different from 
each other in various respects. Importantly, I view them as similar enough to warrant the same tax 
treatment. See infra Part III.C. 
 85. See Rustad, supra note 27, at 1301 (characterizing tort reform of punitive damages as 
―special legislation to help corporate America‖); see also THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, 
IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: 
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Interestingly, by drawing on the work of Jean Hampton‘s victim-
vindication justification for punishment,
86
 many of these scholars, such as 
Professors Galanter and Luban, view themselves as committed to realizing 
the goals and values of retributive justice.
87
 But, as emphasized in the 
insightful interpretive accounts of tort law and punitive damages by 
Professors Zipursky and Sebok, the tort system conventionally empowers 
victims to either pursue punitive damages or forbear from pursuing such 
damages.
88
 This critical point demonstrates that no one forces punitive 
damages on the victim in the common law approach. Rather, the decision 
to seek legal recourse permits the victim to exercise her autonomy and 
seek repair to her dignity interests. The same may be said for allowing 
victims to have almost unfettered control over settlements with 
defendants.  
These two practices (concerning discretion to settle or not sue 
altogether) reveal an important gap between victim-vindication accounts 
and the interests underlying a properly understood retributivist account. 
Retributivists, as explained in Retributive Damages, have strong reasons to 
give weight to the reduction of both Type I false-positive errors (in which 
people are mistakenly punished or excessively punished) and Type II 
false-negative errors (in which wrongdoers escape their punishment 
altogether or receive too lenient a punishment).
89
 Importantly, the victim-
vindication accounts say little about the need for building a system that 
tries to reduce all four kinds of Type I and Type II errors having to do with 
under- and over-punishment.
90
  
 
 
The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (1999); David F. Partlett, The Republican Model and 
Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409 (2004) (defending a robust role for juries in punitive 
damages awards on the basis of republican theory). 
 86. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1685–98 (1992) (arguing that conduct that expresses disrespect 
and does damage to the ―value of the victim‖ warrants a punitive response to vindicate the victim‘s 
moral worth). 
 87. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 13, at 1432–35. The same can largely be said for the other 
scholars, including Professors Colby, Geistfeld, Goldberg, Sebok, and Zipursky, most of whom have 
also claimed being influenced by Professor Hampton‘s work. See sources cited supra note 13. 
 88. See Sebok, From Myth to Theory, supra note 13, at 1005 (―Plaintiffs who may have a valid 
legal claim for punitive damages are under no obligation to pursue them.‖); id. at 1029 (stressing ―the 
active role of the victim in determining the appropriate remedy‖); Zipursky, supra note 13, at 152 
(―[T]he state is not in the driver‘s seat.‖). See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not 
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 733–37 (2003).  
 89. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at 247, 266. 
 90. Thus, Galanter and Luban‘s account of punitive damages is best seen as primarily (though 
not exclusively) a victim-vindication account, not a retributive justice account. See Markel, Retributive 
Damages, supra note 17, at 255 n.62. The same can largely be said for the other victim-vindication 
proponents cited supra note 13. In truth, their interests and values are better described as consistent 
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Indeed, to the extent that victim-vindication supporters invoke 
retributive justice values to bolster their accounts, this silence is a 
significant weakness.
91
 After all, the failures to defend procedural 
safeguards and to create meaningful guidelines for cabining jury discretion 
and judicial review are recipes for Type I error creation in the context of 
punitive damages. Moreover, giving only victims the right to pursue 
punitive damages or giving all victim-plaintiffs the unfettered authority to 
settle a case involving allegations of reckless or malicious misconduct 
enables a higher risk of Type II errors.
92
 This should be of concern to 
nonretributivists as well: certainty of punishment, perhaps more than 
severity of punishment, has for the last generation or so been thought to 
have an appreciable effect on reducing misconduct.
93 
Thus, a publicly minded ―retributivist‖ scheme of punitive damages 
must reflect some concern for reducing both Type I and Type II errors in a 
manner that can roughly achieve some form of evenhandedness across 
similar kinds of cases.
94
 Of course, states may decide they also want a 
 
 
with ―victim vindication‖ and less so with retributive justice, at least when the latter is understood as a 
practice of state punishment interested in developing institutions that promote equality and rule of law 
values in the reduction of Type I and Type II punishment errors. Of course, that‘s not to say victims 
have no role to play in the effectuation of retributive justice; they do, but it is a limited one. See Dan 
Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 452–57 (2005) [hereinafter Markel, 
State, Be Not Proud]. 
 91. To its credit, Professor Sebok‘s state-sanctioned revenge account is consistent with a desire 
to reduce ―piling on‖ (or Type I overpunishment) errors that occur through introducing evidence of 
harms to strangers to the litigation. See Sebok, From Myth to Theory, supra note 13, at 1031–35. But 
Sebok fails to address the public’s interest in reducing Type II errors of either sort or the procedural 
safeguards necessary to prevent Type I errors of the mistaken-punishment sort. Similarly, for cases 
involving fatal risks, the methodology proposed by Professor Geistfeld is helpful in ensuring some 
evenhandedness across cases involving certain tort victims. See Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, supra 
note 13. That said, this methodology says little about how to reduce the gamut of Type I and Type II 
errors outside the relatively narrow but important context he focuses on; moreover, even in the context 
of fatal risks, Geistfeld‘s proposal provides no manner by which to address the public‘s interest in 
reducing Type II errors involving nonpunishment. 
 92. Such Type II errors leading to underenforcement are rife. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really 
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1147, 1183 (1992) (―A great many potential plaintiffs are never heard from by the injurers or their 
insurers.‖); see also Richard L. Abel, The Real Torts Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 
(1987); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1159 (1996) 
(noting that ―relatively few‖ tort claims are brought to court). 
 93. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 45–48 (1999); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of 
Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 308 (1991). But see Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect 
of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. 
Q. 173, 176–86, 188–92, 214–15 (1987) (taking a more skeptical view upon review of the evidence). 
 94. Cf. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (―Thus, a penalty should be 
reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes‘s ‗bad man‘ can look ahead with 
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pluralistic scheme of extracompensatory damages, one that provides space 
for the pursuit of cost internalization or victim vindication or both as well. 
Part II.C says more about how to create that pluralistic framework.
95
 That 
said, I am not arguing here that states must pursue all three purposes 
(retribution, victim vindication, and cost internalization) through their 
extracompensatory damages regimes. Rather, I want to give them options 
about how to do so and how to think about the relevant tax rules. But 
before heading too far down that path, we need a better sense of what 
public retributive justice theory entails for the implementation of punitive 
damages. The following section provides a summary of the basic structure 
of retributive damages. 
B. The Basic Structure of Retributive Damages: A Recap 
While this Section outlines the basic structure of retributive damages, it 
does not explain in detail the rationale underlying this structure or why 
this structure is desirable vis-à-vis other remedial or penal options. Those 
issues are both addressed and defended at length in Retributive Damages.
96
 
As demonstrated there, retributive justice theory offers not only a reason 
for reconfiguring punitive damages, but also a set of constraints.
97
 After 
all, once properly understood, retributive justice is tethered to concerns for 
equality, modesty, accuracy, proportionality, impartiality, and the rule of 
law; such notions are largely missing not only from current common law 
punitive damages practices but also, to varying degrees, from the accounts 
of those scholars emphasizing punitive damages as vehicles for 
vindicating a private plaintiff‘s interest in ―poetic justice‖98 or revenge,99 
or a jury‘s interest in ventilating its outrage.100 In some respects, this 
public retributive interest means ensuring modest and fair sanctions across 
 
 
some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another. . . . And when 
the bad man‘s counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme they face ought to threaten 
them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage.‖). 
 95. The following caveat is necessary: in identifying three plausible forms of extracompensatory 
damages (retributive, deterrence, and aggravated), I recognize that I am merely adopting certain 
scholars‘ views on how to conceptualize and implement what I am calling aggravated and deterrence 
damages. This caveat seems necessary in light of the fact that there are disagreements within the cost-
internalization school and within the victim-vindication camp over various details. The goal has been 
to give an overview of these various objectives as they would influence a state operating in a post–
Philip Morris world.  
 96. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17. 
 97. See id. at 304–09. 
 98. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 13, passim. 
 99. See Colby, supra note 13, at 433; Sebok, From Myth to Theory, supra note 13, at 1031. 
 100. See Wenger & Hoffman, supra note 84, at 1138–40.  
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the realm of similarly situated defendants; in other respects, it means 
ensuring safeguards to achieve accuracy, impartiality, and proportionality 
in a particular case. 
In Retributive Damages, these claims were advanced largely on the 
back of an account of punishment earlier called the confrontational 
conception of retributivism (CCR).
101
 The CCR seeks to communicate to 
defendants our seriousness about particular interests by applying some 
level of coercive condemnatory setback on account of her violating the 
state‘s law. In the retributive damages context, the statute describing the 
scope of retributive damages is the dictate of law. Hence, someone who 
violates that statute stands in a similar position, vis-à-vis the CCR, as 
someone who, for example, violates a typical criminal prohibition against 
theft or fraud. The offense warrants a coercive response by the state that 
adequately and parsimoniously communicates condemnation of that 
offense to the offender. Assuming that the offender is without further 
justification or excuse, that person ought to be punished through 
retributive damages because doing so helps instantiate our commitments 
that we are moral agents capable of conforming our behavior to law and 
being held responsible; that, under the law, we all are entitled to enjoy the 
same cluster of equal liberty; and that we will defend our democratic 
sovereignty regarding that package of liberty against usurpations by 
offenders. By extending punishment against violators of this retributive 
damages statute, we continue to vindicate the value of persons‘ rights and 
interests, as well as our belief in the moral competence of persons to act 
freely within a zone created by those protected rights and interests.  
One virtue of this account, when fully fleshed out, is its ability to 
explain both the internal intelligibility of retributive justice within a liberal 
democracy and the limits that may reasonably be placed on that social 
practice to help distinguish it from naked revenge. Significantly, this 
account explains the need for reducing both Type I and Type II errors. 
Accounts of both retributive justice and retributive damages ought to offer 
 
 
 101. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at pt. II. My prior works have addressed 
how this theory applies to other policy issues. See generally Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1421 (2004); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and 
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001); Markel, State, 
Be Not Proud, supra note 90, at 457–77; Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of 
Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 392 (1999). More recently, this theory 
was extended to the Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Dan Markel, Executing 
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2009), and 
the role that a defendant‘s family status should play in her criminal liability and punishment. See DAN 
MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009). 
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sustained reflection on the reasonable reduction of all of these errors. As 
mentioned earlier, and by contrast, victim-vindication and cost-
internalization accounts lack the conceptual resources to do so 
effectively.
102
  
Hence, under the retributive damages framework, when people defy 
certain legal obligations, the state may either seek to punish them through 
traditional criminal law or make available the sanction of retributive 
damages. Such damages would be credited against any further criminal 
sanctions imposed by the state for the same misconduct. Retributive 
damages statutes would empower victims—or, in some cases, after public 
declinations to prosecute, private attorneys general (PAGs)
103—to act on 
behalf of the state to seek the imposition of an ―intermediate sanction.‖ 
These penalties are basically a stripped-down civil fine; they neither 
trigger the status of a conviction nor do they instigate any collateral 
consequences or future disabilities as a result of retributive damages 
liability. 
Under this scheme, the amount of the penalty is determined largely by 
the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s misconduct. Specifically, the fine‘s 
amount is informed by two kinds of measurements. The first measurement 
is a number on a reprehensibility scale, while the second translates that 
reprehensibility score to an amount of damages corresponding, in the case 
of an individual defendant, to a percentage of wealth or some other 
relevant metric of financial position.
104
 As a preliminary matter, the state 
legislature or sentencing commission would devise a set of guidelines and 
commentaries for juries (or judges in bench trials) to help them objectively 
assess how reprehensible the misconduct is.
105
 These commentaries would 
include hypothetical examples of misconduct that fell on various places on 
the scale. 
 
 
 102. The victim-vindication accounts, sources cited supra note 13, say little about how to achieve 
consistency and predictability across cases. Furthermore, the dominant cost-internalization accounts do 
not typically require inquiry into and judgment of the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s actions, so its 
proponents are not really interested in communicating condemnation to offenders. See, e.g., Thomas C. 
Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3 
(1990); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20. 
 103. In Retributive Damages, I explain why and how nonvictims should have a role in facilitating 
the punishment of misconduct that involved harmless wrongdoing or wrongs that victims themselves 
did not seek to vindicate (fully). See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at 279–86.  
 104. For business entities, the metric would probably focus on net value, using the kinds of 
valuation techniques frequently deployed in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 
 105. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions 
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with 
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2077–78 (1998) (noting consistency 
of moral judgments but inconsistency in translating outrage into dollars).  
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Equipped with these guidelines, juries would calibrate reprehensibility 
along a scale, perhaps from one to twenty with twenty being the worst, 
using many of the factors that courts currently use to evaluate the 
defendant‘s reprehensibility.106 Some factors, such as a defendant‘s history 
of past adjudicated misconduct, might increase reprehensibility. Other 
factors, such as preexisting compliance programs or remedial actions and 
restitution measures taken by the defendant upon discovery of the 
misconduct, might mitigate reprehensibility. Importantly, the jury would 
only determine the reprehensibility level. (The court would then link the 
reprehensibility score to the percentage of the defendant‘s wealth or value 
established by the state.) Thus, to use an example, a jury finding of two on 
the scale of reprehensibility could lead to a retributive damages award of 
1% of the defendant‘s net wealth, and a finding of twenty could lead to 
10% of the defendant‘s assets being assessed.107 
To ensure that the defendant does not benefit from the misconduct 
against the plaintiff, the total retributive damages penalty should also strip 
the defendant of any gains in excess of compensatory damages that are 
owed to the plaintiff and that arose from the misconduct. These payments 
(the gains and the reprehensibility-based penalty) go to the state.
108
 The 
defendant should also pay the plaintiff‘s lawyers‘ fees (for the amounts 
related to the marginal labor necessary to prove the defendant‘s 
reprehensibility) and a modest and fixed award (a finder‘s fee) to the 
plaintiff—perhaps something in the range of $10,000—for bringing the 
 
 
 106. This scaling approach addresses some of the concerns raised by Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., Cass 
R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 179–81 (2004) 
(recognizing the value of guidelines and benchmarks for improved cognition and fairness in punitive 
damages awards across cases). 
 107. Cf. Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at 289–96 (offering rationales for ―scaling 
fines to the defendant‘s financial position‖). To be sure, using flat percentages of wealth or net value 
would not necessarily do the same work in addressing ―diminishing marginal utility of money‖ as a 
progressively increasing set of percentage-based fines. See id. at 292–93. But there are some reasons to 
think that such ―progressivity‖ is inapposite to a system meant to express a commitment to the idea 
that we are equal under the law. See id. at 293. 
 108. The gain-stripping aspect of the retributive damages structure makes this approach largely if 
not always consistent with the ―complete deterrence‖ approach advocated by economists such as Keith 
Hylton. See Hylton, supra note 75, at 464–67 (stressing that the penalty system for illicit gains should 
eliminate the prospect of gain by the offender); see also David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary 
Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20 (1990). But the 
retributive damages penalty also includes a wealth- and reprehensibility-informed monetary penalty 
that puts the defendant in a worse position than she was at the status quo ante. Complete deterrence 
models permit but do not require that setback, which is part of how the retributive message of 
condemnation is communicated. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at 242–43 
(contrasting the messages of complete deterrence and retribution). Moreover, complete deterrence 
models would not require an adherence to proportionality as an independent value in the setting of the 
financial setback. 
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case to the public‘s attention.109 These payments together (to the state, the 
plaintiff, and the lawyer) constitute one sensible way, perhaps among 
others, to structure extracompensatory damages designed to advance the 
goals of retributive justice.
110
 Of course, the jurisdiction could also permit 
the plaintiff to receive aggravated damages if compensatory damages in 
that jurisdiction did not already account for an injury to dignity. 
Consistent with the notion that retributive damages are supposed to 
serve as an intermediate sanction on the public‘s behalf in order to punish 
rather than destroy, legislatures may authorize courts to order defendants 
to pay the damages amount as a percentage of profits in coming years in 
situations where a defendant has reason to doubt her livelihood‘s viability 
if required to pay one lump sum. Additionally, if one is concerned that a 
defendant committed grave misconduct and then restructured her finances 
to make it appear that she could not pay the amount owed, the courts 
might adjust the retributive damages based on the financial condition of 
the defendant at the time the misconduct (last) occurred.
111 
The regime described above furnishes potential defendants little basis 
for complaining that the amount or award of retributive damages is a 
surprise, since the standards that would be applied to them are no different 
than the guidelines that have now become familiar in many jurisdictions 
when assessing criminal liability and sentencing.
112
 Of course, defendants 
in criminal cases have more procedural safeguards in place, and thus, if we 
are deputizing plaintiffs to facilitate the imposition of an intermediate civil 
sanction, then we should enhance at least some of the procedural 
protections available in retributive damages cases, an aspect of the 
argument developed in How Should Punitive Damages Work?
113
  
 
 
 109. I will say more about this distribution later, but now I just point out that the flat amount 
avoids the lottery effects that a plaintiff would enjoy from having the good ―fortune‖ of having a 
wealthy injurer. 
 110. Other valuation methodologies might also be consistent with retributive justice values. See 
Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, supra note 13, at 286–92, 306 (proposing for torts involving fatal risks a 
damages valuation that examines government data regarding the monetization of fatal risks); Markel, 
Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at 287 n.166, 290 n.181 (explaining why a multiplier of 
compensatory damages for torts involving purely financial losses might also comply with retributive 
justice values). Despite some open-mindedness toward these alternative methods of assessing 
retributive damages, I note that if they were to be used, the amounts imposed would also need to 
satisfy the retributive goals of stripping the gain and imposing an adequate, proportionate, and 
nondestructive setback on the defendant.  
 111. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, the restructuring to evade payment could arguably 
be a factor used to raise one‘s reprehensibility score.  
 112. See generally, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1194–1208 (2005). 
 113. See generally Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. 
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C. Building a Pluralistic Structure: A Summary 
As indicated earlier, while retributive damages are important, they are 
not meant to displace extracompensatory damages that reasonably achieve 
other goals.
114
 Rather, under such a framework, extracompensatory 
damages would be available separately if necessary for retributive, cost-
internalization, and victim-vindication purposes. Respectively, there 
would be three kinds of extracompensatory damages: retributive, 
deterrence, and aggravated damages. Consistent with that pluralistic 
approach, different procedural safeguards and standards of review would 
be appropriate for each kind of extracompensatory damages. States could 
choose one, two, or all three of these measures.  
Because much work has already been done conceptualizing the policies 
of aggravated and deterrence damages,
115
 the focus of this Section is on 
the relatively less familiar genre of retributive damages. Importantly, the 
heightened level of safeguards for retributive damages would be 
responsive to the concern raised by some who have argued that punitive 
damages, insofar as they are serving public retributive (or complete 
deterrence) goals, are unconstitutional because defendants facing punitive 
damages lack any of the procedural safeguards provided in criminal 
cases.
116
 As explained elsewhere,
117
 the problem with this challenge is that 
it mistakenly implies that criminal procedural safeguards apply like a 
binary switch that toggles between on or off. In fact, as criminal procedure 
scholars are well aware, the extent of protection provided by many 
procedural safeguards operates on a continuum marked by the severity of 
the punishment imposed.
118
 The same logic should apply to retributive 
damages.  
Consequently, the extent of such protections would fall roughly 
between the extent of protection we confer to defendants in cases 
involving compensatory damages and the extent we confer to defendants 
in criminal cases involving modest sanctions such as criminal fines. But 
 
 
 114. Cf. Galanter & Luban, supra note 13, at 1451 (―Efficiency plays no role in the normative 
universe of punitive damages as we conceive of it.‖).  
 115. See sources cited supra note 13 (focusing on aggravated damages); Polinsky & Shavell, 
supra note 20 (focusing on deterrence damages); Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 
supra note 17, at 1387 n.5 (collecting sources generally).  
 116. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 13; Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive 
Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the 
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The 
Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).  
 117. Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. 
 118. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(c), (e) (2d ed. 1999).  
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consistency with constitutional mandates is not the only goal; the level of 
procedural protections should also be faithful to the basic values 
underlying retributive justice.  
Accordingly, some safeguards would be necessary for the justified 
imposition of retributive damages as an intermediate civil sanction. Per the 
proposal, defendants facing retributive damages would receive:  
A. more protection than currently permitted with respect to 
duplicative punishment;  
B. a heightened standard of proof (clear and convincing evidence) 
with respect to the mens rea of the defendant;  
C. a standard of appellate review that distinguishes between the 
factual predicates (for which deference is owed) and the evaluative 
assessments of the jury (for which deference is not owed because 
the key is consistency with the guidelines and commentaries 
provided by the legislature); and 
D. a right to have bifurcated trial proceedings regarding wealth and 
liability.
119
  
By contrast, the same precautionary measures do not necessarily apply 
when defendants are facing nonretributive extracompensatory damages. 
Of course, some measures and safeguards for deterrence and aggravated 
damages are warranted to ensure fidelity to constitutional principles 
associated with federalism and basic procedural fairness. Thus, it is very 
likely that the rulings of Philip Morris would still govern aggravated and 
deterrence damages. Contrary to some scholars,
120
 my view is that 
deterrence damages would be limited to an inquiry regarding the 
likelihood that the defendant would evade compensation to the plaintiff(s) 
only, and not strangers to the litigation. Evidence of ―other acts‖ toward 
 
 
 119. With respect to the intermediate civil sanction of retributive damages, a heightened level of 
procedural safeguards made more sense because it showed greater concern for Type I errors involving 
mistaken or excessively high damages than would be appropriate under compensatory damages. That 
heightened level was still cognizant of the fact that retributive damages would not be as severe a 
sanction as a criminal fine. Indeed, the retributive damages sanction would be a penalty that falls on 
the civil side, and thus would trigger no state-imposed collateral consequences and no status of 
―conviction.‖ A useful paradigm for thinking about these issues is the burden of proof. There should 
be a heightened level of proof required to secure retributive damages (clear and convincing—not 
preponderance of the evidence, but not beyond a reasonable doubt). That would show what is meant 
by an intermediate level of procedural safeguards to accompany an intermediate sanction. Of course, 
using the kinds of guidelines and commentaries mentioned earlier would also work toward a more 
evenhanded and predictable distribution of retributive damages across cases.  
 120. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 13; Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 63. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] OVERCOMING TRADEOFFS 641 
 
 
 
 
others would still be permissible to establish that the defendant acted as 
part of a plan or deliberate strategy rather than some mistake, but per 
Philip Morris, the defendant would not be punished based on harms to 
others against whom the defendant might have valid defenses. Under such 
a rule, states would not be able to deputize plaintiffs to use aggravated or 
deterrence damages to regulate conduct outside their jurisdiction. Other 
due process constraints already articulated by the Supreme Court would 
still apply: thus, defendants would be entitled to post-trial and appellate 
review of aggravated and deterrence damages;
121
 such review would be de 
novo in federal cases;
122
 and the amount of such damages would be 
subjected to the ―guideposts‖ analysis offered in BMW and State Farm.123 
Indeed, where juries impose retributive damages, as well as aggravated or 
deterrence damages, judicial review of all the types of damages should be 
especially searching to ensure the juries‘ calculations are reasonable. 
Even with these various safeguards, a pluralistic approach has to be 
mindful of the difficulties associated with realizing public goals in private 
litigation. With respect to settlement of claims involving the potential for 
retributive damages in particular, where the government is the principal 
recipient of the penalty paid by the defendant, various checks should be 
placed on litigants. This is the case because, as described in Part I in the 
context of how parties might try to circumvent the effects of a 
nondeductibility rule, private parties have strong incentives to engage in 
settlements that disguise punishment as compensation and thus prevent the 
government from collecting its share of the retributive penalty. As 
elaborated in Part III, various mechanisms can be used to increase the 
likelihood that the retributive portion of any settlement is correctly 
classified as such.
124
 In other words, these checks are important because 
they are tactics available to protect the public‘s interest with respect to 
retributive damages and the correct taxation thereof.  
In sum, under this proposal, retributive damages would be one of three 
extracompensatory remedies available. Importantly, the retributive 
damages penalty requires more public governmental input and oversight 
 
 
 121. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994). 
 122. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001). 
 123. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 124. See infra notes 150–56 and accompanying text (discussing requirements to (a) allege 
requisite culpability for retributive damages in initial complaint; (b) have judicial supervision and 
transparency over suits involving retributive damages; and (c) ensure that the relevant government 
agency signs off on any pre-filing settlement to ensure defendant acquires repose from possible private 
attorney general actions).  
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because it is the civil damages measure that most clearly speaks in the 
public‘s interest and is also the most vulnerable to manipulation in private-
party litigation. By contrast, the responsibility for realizing the goals of 
optimal deterrence (at least in a post–Philip Morris world) and victim 
vindication can reasonably be left to the parties themselves. I will say a bit 
more about that possibility of private ordering in the next Part, where the 
focus shines on the appropriate tax rules that should be used to correspond 
to this trifurcated scheme of extracompensatory damages. 
III. TAXING EXTRACOMPENSATORY DAMAGES PROPERLY 
In this Part, I discuss the tax rules that should apply to the 
extracompensatory damages structure described in Part II. Specifically, I 
try to show what the appropriate tax rules are for retributive, aggravated, 
and deterrence damages designed to achieve retributive justice, victim 
vindication, and optimal deterrence, respectively. 
A. Taxing Retributive Damages 
1. Retributive Damages and Federalism Tradeoffs  
Assume that a state implements a retributive damages regime similar to 
the one proposed in Part II. Should defendants paying those penalties in 
the context of business-related torts be permitted to deduct those 
penalties? Or should these payments be nondeductible? 
Under current tax law, civil fines are nondeductible when those fines 
are paid to a government.
125
 Because the retributive penalty is analogous 
to a civil fine in that it is both a sanction and paid to the government, it 
could be argued that retributive penalties likewise ought to be 
nondeductible, at least under current law. 
However, here I am addressing the proper normative tax treatment of 
the retributive damages penalty, and it is not clear that the current tax 
treatment of civil fines is necessarily the correct normative approach. For 
example, civil fines are distinct from the retributive penalty in a very 
important respect. Fines are often imposed without regard to the individual 
attributes, such as financial condition of the wrongdoer. On the other hand, 
the amount of the retributive penalty is determined in a highly 
 
 
 125. See I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006). 
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individualized manner. As a result, a retributive penalty could easily be 
adjusted to take into account tax effects.
126
  
Moreover, a retributive damages penalty system could provide a 
schedule of intended penalty amounts and then require the decision maker 
to gross up these amounts where appropriate.
127
 Existing civil fine regimes 
ordinarily lack this flexibility.
128
  
Note that if gross ups were calculated properly, defendants would be 
indifferent as to whether the retributive penalty is deductible or not. This is 
because a proper gross up would precisely offset the benefit of a 
deduction. The same indifference to the tax rule holds true for plaintiffs; 
plaintiffs would be indifferent to the deductibility rule for defendants 
because, under the proposal mentioned in Part II, plaintiffs would receive 
only a flat finder‘s fee (as opposed to a percentage of the retributive 
penalty).
129
 The plaintiff‘s lawyers would similarly be indifferent to the tax 
treatment of the defendant because their fees are based on the time, 
expense, risk, and expertise involved, and not on the amount of the 
recovery.
130
  
 
 
 126. Two side notes: First, defendants might try to manipulate their marginal tax rates in response 
to such tax-adjusted penalties. Professor Polsky and I address this concern elsewhere. See Polsky & 
Markel, supra note 6, at 1354 n.136. Second, one also must consider the tax rules associated with the 
defendant‘s payments of amounts related to the retributive penalty such as gain stripping, payment of 
the finder‘s fee for plaintiff, and reimbursement of the plaintiff‘s attorney‘s fees. With respect to post–
Philip Morris gain stripping, which focuses on removing the profit the defendant made vis-à-vis the 
activity toward this plaintiff, there is no need for the jury to use a tax-aware approach unless the gain 
were also calculated and shown to a jury in an after-tax manner. Vis-à-vis the reimbursement of a 
plaintiff‘s attorney‘s fees for the retributive portion of the recovery and the finder‘s fee portions, I 
view these as part of the ―retributive damages,‖ and thus they should be treated in a manner consistent 
with the wealth-adjusted setback, as discussed in the text. On the plaintiff‘s side, the finder‘s fee 
compensates the plaintiff for bringing the underlying action and prosecuting the retributive claim, and 
should thus be included in the plaintiff‘s gross income, just like other accessions to wealth.  
 127. As noted earlier, the gross-up calculation is relatively mechanical after one determines the 
amount of the intended after-tax penalty and the defendant‘s marginal tax rate. A chart would provide 
the amount of the intended after-tax penalty along with the facts found by the jury or judge. The jury 
(as fact finders) would determine the defendant‘s marginal tax rate. In addition, the jury would decide 
the issue of deductibility in cases where it may be disputed (e.g., in a case where the plaintiff‘s claim is 
arguably not connected to the defendant‘s business). That said, the proposal admittedly raises some 
―second generation‖ questions associated with inquiries into marginal tax rates: for example, what do 
you do with marginal tax rates that change year to year; should we average the marginal tax rates 
across a number of years? And what if there‘s a recalculation? I leave the full articulation of these 
challenges, and their possible resolutions, to more talented tax scholars.  
 128. Of course, jurisdictions might also wish to consider whether to make their fines tax aware.  
 129. If plaintiffs were entitled to a percentage of the retributive penalty, then plaintiffs would 
likely prefer a deductible regime because then they would receive a percentage of the grossed-up 
amount. 
 130. Amounts received by plaintiffs and their lawyers for seeking retributive damages would be 
taxed as income, just like other accessions to wealth. 
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While the issue of deductibility would have little impact on the 
litigants, it would significantly impact the federal government and the 
states in which the cases are litigated.
131
 If defendants were allowed to 
deduct the retributive penalty, the effect is a wealth transfer from the 
federal government to the state. To illustrate this effect, consider a case 
where the legislature intended that the defendant experience a wealth-
adjusted financial setback of $100,000. Assume further that a $10,000 
finder‘s fee inures to the plaintiff and that this fee comes out of the 
defendant‘s penalty. If the retributive penalty were nondeductible, then the 
penalty imposed against the defendant equals $100,000. By contrast, if the 
retributive penalties were deductible, then the penalty would equal 
$167,000 because of the gross up (assuming the same 40% tax bracket).
132
  
Notice what happens here: under a nondeductible regime, the state 
would recover $90,000 ($100,000 penalty–$10,000 finder‘s fee). Under a 
deductible regime, the state would recover $157,000 ($167,000 penalty–
$10,000 finder‘s fee). The plaintiff recovers $6,000 after tax ($10,000–
40%) in either case. In a deductible regime, the federal government 
effectively pays the $67,000 difference to the state. That is the amount of 
the reduction in the defendant‘s federal tax liability as a result of being 
able to deduct the $167,000 amount of the retributive penalty.
133
 The chart 
below summarizes these results: 
 
Regime 
Nominal 
Amount of 
Retributive 
Penalty 
Plaintiff‘s 
After-Tax 
Recovery 
Defendant‘s 
After-Tax 
Cost 
State‘s 
Recovery 
Change in Federal Revenues 
in Switching from a 
Nondeductible Regime to 
Deductible Regime  
Nondeductible $100,000 $6,000 ($100,000) $90,000 N/A 
Deductible $167,000 $6,000 ($100,000) $157,000 ($67,000) 
The effect of making the retributive penalty deductible in this case is to 
transfer $67,000 of wealth from the federal government (in the form of 
reduced federal tax revenues) to the state (in the form of an augmented 
retributive penalty). Generalizing more broadly, the amount of the wealth 
transfer to the state will equal the amount of the gross up.  
Is such a wealth transfer from the federal to the state government 
appropriate? To answer that, there are a number of issues to consider. 
 
 
 131. For this example, I assume the retributive-damages structure would take place in a state court 
based on a state cause of action. 
 132. Assuming a 40% marginal tax rate, an intended $100,000 dollar ―after-tax‖ penalty would 
require $167,000 of the defendant‘s gross pre-tax income. I have rounded up to the nearest $1000. 
 133. $167,000 x 40% = $67,000. Again, here I have rounded up to the nearest $1000. 
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First, one could contend that by discussing a wealth transfer from the 
federal to the state government, I have assumed improperly that the 
baseline of nondeductibility for retributive damages is neutral and 
natural.
134
 Some scholars, such as Professor Eric Zolt, might say that the 
rule disallowing deductions for such damages (as embodied in the Code‘s 
§ 162(f)) is in fact a departure from a more neutral baseline allowing 
deductions for expenses incurred in the course of running a business.
135
 On 
this view, the more neutral way to present this issue would be to simply 
present both scenarios, that is, the putative wealth transfer from federal to 
state occurring under a deductibility rule and the putative wealth transfer 
from state to federal coffers that occurs under a nondeductibility rule. I 
think this point makes sense if we‘re talking about achieving optimal 
deterrence, but I‘m less sure it makes sense when we‘re talking about 
government penalties for wrongdoing. Indeed, as Professor Zolt himself 
acknowledges, prior to the passage of § 162(f), courts regularly denied 
deductions for fines or other penalties paid to the government for 
wrongdoing.
136
 So the selection of this baseline doesn‘t seem especially 
controversial to me in the context of a retributive sanction speaking in the 
language of condemnation, as opposed to an optimal-deterrence sanction 
interested in calibrating private and public incentives to reach an optimal 
level of harm.  
Of course, as we‘ll see shortly, not much rides on this selection of the 
baseline; my goal is to figure out the normatively most attractive way to 
deal with such damages from a tax perspective so I‘m not beholden to 
reinforcing the baseline anyway.
137 
Let‘s turn to that specific issue now. From a distributive-justice 
perspective, informed by public choice and economics principles, the issue 
is not easy to resolve without further study. All other things being equal, a 
deductibility rule (i.e., one that transfers money from the federal to the 
 
 
 134. I am grateful to Larry Zelenak for his help with this point. 
 135. See, e.g., Eric Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 352–53 (1989). 
 136. Id. at 350 (noting usage of ―public policy‖ doctrine to disallow various related deductions in 
court decisions prior to 1969 when the Code‘s treatment was clarified by Congress). 
 137. In this respect, it bears emphasis that I am making another assumption, which may not be 
altogether realistic, though perhaps it is permissible in the context of trying to design the right policies 
under ideal conditions: i.e., that states will set the retributive penalty formula solely with an eye to 
appropriate after-tax punishment levels (under either of the possible tax regimes), so that the choice of 
tax regime has no impact on defendants, but only on the state and the federal government. At least one 
of my learned readers of an earlier draft thought that revenue concerns would play some role in the 
setting of retributive penalty formulas; to the extent that surmise is right, defendants would be quite 
interested in the choice between deductibility and nondeductibility.  
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state government) would cause people in (say) Colorado to receive fewer 
federal services or higher federal taxes in order for the federal government 
to subsidize the creation and operation of retributive damages regimes in 
(say) Alabama.
138
 Perhaps this could be justified if there was a positive 
benefit Coloradans enjoyed from enforcement measures taken in 
Alabama—maybe companies facing retributive damages in Alabama will 
improve the safety or marketing of their products in Colorado or 
nationwide as a result. On the other hand, if the action for retributive 
damages in question was purely local and unlikely to have positive ripple 
effects outside the state in which they are imposed, then that would be an 
argument for making retributive damages nondeductible. 
In other words, if retributive damages actions create positive 
externalities outside the state, then a federal subsidy via a deductibility 
rule could be justified because the subsidy would, on the margins, 
stimulate states to develop and enforce retributive damages schemes. The 
question from this perspective is whether retributive damages schemes are 
underprovided from a social perspective; if they are, then deductibility 
could be justified. By contrast, if the benefits of such actions are localized, 
or if retributive damages actions are likely to be ―overproduced,‖ perhaps 
because of the political power of the plaintiffs‘ bar at state level, then 
additional subsidies to the state via a deductibility rule would be 
counterproductive.
139 
There are other considerations as well. On the one hand, it may seem 
arbitrary for the federal government to effectively allocate money to states 
based on torts enforcement activity. After all, if the state had decided to 
take the money it would use to subsidize the tort system and instead put it 
in the criminal justice system, the criminal fines it would collect there 
would be nondeductible (at least under current tax law). Hence, if the state 
thought a $100,000 fine with after-tax dollars against a defendant were 
appropriate, it would only collect $100,000 of the defendant‘s after-tax 
dollars. Making retributive damages deductible thus encourages states to 
invest in retributive damages regimes (with gross ups) instead of 
allocating more money to the criminal justice system.
140 
 
 
 138. Alas, there is one other (pernicious and all too familiar) option: no tax increases or cuts in 
spending but rather just continued deficit spending that will hurt future generations. 
 139. Cf. Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 
164 of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 687–91 (2007) (discussing use of federal deduction for state 
and local taxes paid as a means for encouraging states to produce positive externalities for other 
states). 
 140. Some states might nonetheless prefer the greater certainty of getting their money through a 
mechanism of a fine instead of retributive damages on the theory that the jury might not figure out 
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On the other hand, and more persuasively, it is and should be the 
state’s choice to decide to supervise retributive damages cases and provide 
courts for these disputes, so it is not unreasonable for the states to capture 
more of the money here if they prefer to spend more on tort enforcement 
and less on criminal prosecutions. Indeed, the effect of a deductibility rule 
would be to provide a marginal incentive to states to encourage forums for 
retributive damages.
141
  
That said, in light of the fact that states would already be capturing a 
significant portion of the retributive damages in a nondeductible regime 
(e.g., $90,000), it seems as if they are already operating under a significant 
incentive. Moreover, a nondeductible regime of retributive damages 
spreads the damages across the levels of government to a broader set of 
political constituents.
142
  
That is the theoretical lay of the land. In the abstract, it is difficult to 
predict with certainty whether a nondeductibility rule for retributive 
damages would be more beneficial than a rule permitting deductibility and 
gross ups. The deductibility rule makes more sense when the defendant is 
a business that either substantially engages in or affects interstate 
commerce.
143
 If the deductibility rule for retributive damages is embraced 
based on that assumption, it would require amending § 162(f) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Conversely, it would make sense to leave the 
Code‘s relevant language the same as it is now if nondeductibility for 
retributive damages were embraced on the (probably unlikely) assumption 
that most economic activity does not involve interstate commerce. Such a 
distinction might be hard to implement, though, and in any event, one 
 
 
what it should do and since the state might think criminal justice would be less complicated. That 
concern could largely be obviated by having judges do the gross ups. See supra note 22. 
 141. The deductibility rule might also encourage states to lobby for a change to the tax rule 
regarding fines (i.e., make them deductible also), and then have the defendant‘s financial position and 
marginal tax rate affect the fines as well. Whether the states will successfully lobby the federal 
government on this issue is another matter. 
 142. This diversified spread might reduce the likelihood of states and local juries being corrupted 
by the prospect of enriching their state‘s coffers with lucre from retributive damages. This concern, 
however, might be hard to credit. Given that the state will be enriched from retributive damages even 
under a nondeductibility rule, it is hard to know if the marginal incentive achieved by deductibility 
with gross ups is enough to cause concern about corruption. After all, the incentive arises from a 
relatively obscure aspect of tax law and thus is one that most lay persons cannot be expected to readily 
appreciate.  
 143. One possible and rough proxy for determining the extent to which the business defendant 
engages in or substantially affects interstate commerce is whether the defendant is obligated to comply 
with the employment laws of Title VII. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (defining affected 
employers as those employing fifteen or more employees within a specific period). 
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must still consider how settlement and administrative issues might affect 
the analysis further, especially if the PAG framework is also embraced.
144
  
2. Circumvention 
Part I explained that making punitive damages nondeductible would 
result in significant opportunities for circumvention. These opportunities 
would exist because of the different tax treatment that would be applied to 
punitive damages (nondeductible) and the related compensatory damages 
(deductible).  
If a state implemented a retributive damages regime and Congress 
made these payments nondeductible, would the same circumvention 
opportunities arise? At first glance, it might appear so because payments 
of deductible compensatory damages would be tax preferred relative to the 
nondeductible retributive penalty. Thus, litigants would appear to have the 
same joint incentive to ―transform punishment into compensation‖ during 
settlement.
145 
However, the reform proposal for retributive damages briefly 
summarized in Part II has three features that are designed to preclude such 
collusion. First, plaintiffs must signal in their initial complaint that they 
are seeking retributive damages,
146
 and they must also lodge a copy of the 
initial complaint with a state attorney general‘s representative.147 Second, 
courts must scrutinize and make transparent all settlements of suits where 
plaintiffs lodge retributive damages claims in the initial complaint. Third, 
the state attorney general‘s representative either has to agree to the 
settlement or buy the plaintiffs‘ retributive damages claims (for the 
finder‘s fee) so that the state can prosecute the retributive damages aspect 
of the litigation. These rules would prevent private parties from settling in 
a way that deprives the public of potentially critical information involving 
public misconduct and would convey to the court (and the state) a basis for 
scrutinizing any settlements that arise regarding the nature of the 
misconduct.
148 
 
 
 144. For further discussion and analysis of the PAG aspect of the policy, see Markel, Retributive 
Damages, supra note 17, at 279–86. 
 145. Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive 
Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 229. 
 146. This would be in contrast to those jurisdictions that permit claims for punitive damages only 
after a hearing. See Rustad, supra note 27, at 1313. 
 147. Leave to amend the complaint would be granted only in the rarest of circumstances, such as 
situations where the plaintiff could not have known earlier about the recklessness or malice associated 
with the defendant‘s action. 
 148. Of course, these rules also marginally reduce the incentive for plaintiffs to allege retributive 
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These various anticollusion strategies are a critical aspect of the 
retributive damages proposal because plaintiffs and defendants would 
otherwise have extremely strong reasons to ―collude‖ to downplay the 
value of the retributive claim.
149
 Under the proposal, but without those 
anticollusion measures, the following scenario could occur: plaintiffs 
would get to keep all of their compensatory damages but only the 
relatively small finder‘s fee portion of the retributive penalty. Defendants 
meanwhile would have the incentive to settle for as little as possible and 
would not particularly care whether the state or the plaintiff gets the 
money. Because disguising retributive penalties as compensatory damages 
improves the plaintiff‘s economic position and because such a disguise 
requires cooperation between the litigants, defendants could expect to 
participate in such gain in the form of a reduced settlement amount.
150
 
Thus, the anticollusion safeguards are vital to ensure that the retributive 
portion of any settlement is correctly classified. 
Of course, if plaintiffs decided to go ahead and allege retributive 
damages in the initial complaint, they would not be prohibited from 
settling. But the anticollusion safeguards in place for this scenario would 
require plaintiffs to secure governmental approval to settle, and it would 
force defendants to either (i) admit responsibility and pay some acceptable 
amount of retributive damages to the state or (ii) deny responsibility. If the 
defendant denied responsibility, she would have to convince the state 
attorney general‘s representative that this particular claim lacked merit. 
Otherwise, the state—or conceivably another PAG if the state declined—
could decide to litigate against the defendant.
151
 Once these safeguards 
(and possible future threats) are in place, the settlement dynamics would 
change because defendants would have little incentive to settle unless they 
 
 
damages claims in their complaints if they expect to benefit more from an opaque settlement over 
which they would presumably exercise greater control. That said, defendants might prefer to pay 
money to the state via retributive damages rather than through an opaque settlement to plaintiffs 
because, at least that way, they will acquire a guarantee of repose for past misconduct instead of facing 
the threat of lingering PAG liability for retributive damages. 
 149. See Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. To be sure, these 
safeguards also raise administrative costs, which, one hopes, would be outweighed by the public‘s 
capture of most of the amount of retributive damages. Whether the safeguards also trigger distinctive 
reasons for anxiety about political corruption in the state attorney general‘s office (on the assumption 
that decisionmakers in that office would be unduly influenced or corrupted by special interests), I have 
not addressed before, but, to my mind, these concerns are better addressed through comprehensive 
anticorruption mechanisms rather than removing otherwise good policy options from the table. 
Perhaps this is naïve.  
 150. That is, the settlement amount would be lower than if the retributive penalty was paid 
entirely to the plaintiff. 
 151. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 17, at 279–86. 
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were prepared to admit liability and settle with the state, too. Plaintiffs, in 
turn, would know defendants have diminished incentives to settle quietly, 
and therefore should be less likely to bring suits merely for the purpose of 
harassment. 
Collusive settlements might also seem tempting prior to the filing of a 
complaint. But because of the PAG structure available for retributive 
damages,
152
 the incentives for pre-filing collusion between plaintiffs and 
defendants against the state are also substantially reduced. After all, under 
this scheme a defendant can certainly settle (with much more freedom) 
any nonretributive damages alleged by a plaintiff before and after filing a 
complaint. However, with respect to retributive damages, the defendant 
will not be able to enjoy repose because a PAG may still seek retributive 
damages for claims brought subsequent to the pre-filing settlement—
unless the defendant acquires repose—by having the state ratify the 
settlement between the litigants and collect an amount it deems 
appropriate relative to the retributive damages setback that would 
otherwise be imposed.
153 
To the extent that these safeguards effectively discourage this non-tax-
motivated collusion, they should also discourage the tax-motivated 
collusion that would be available if the retributive penalty were 
nondeductible. This is because the potential tax gains from circumventing 
a nondeductibility rule will often pale in comparison to the potential 
nontax gains from circumventing the rule that the state gets the vast 
majority of the retributive penalty. By making retributive penalties flow 
entirely to the state except for a relatively small finder‘s fee, the effect is a 
near 100% state tax on the plaintiff with respect to the retributive 
penalty.
154
 By comparison, making the retributive penalty nondeductible 
would in effect impose, at most, a roughly 40% tax on the defendant‘s 
retributive penalty. If the safeguards effectively inhibit collusion to avoid 
 
 
 152. See Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. 
 153. When the state settles with defendants, the defendants will have to make a formal record of 
that settlement and its scope to prevent PAGs from needlessly filing suit. PAGs will have to check 
these records before they can proceed with their suits. By including in the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA) a provision that requires defendants to notify the state attorneys general of settlements 
affecting citizens of their state, Congress has created an example to be emulated or tweaked for the 
retributive damages structure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006). For a trenchant analysis of this CAFA 
provision, see Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008). 
 154. For example, if the retributive penalty is $1,000,000 and the finder‘s fee is $10,000, the 
effect of the finder‘s fee regime is a 99% tax on the retributive penalty. Under current punitive 
damages law, the plaintiff would receive substantially more (though not all $1,000,000, of course, 
because the plaintiff would still have to pay legal fees and taxes on the remainder).  
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the near 100% tax on the plaintiff, they should be effective to avoid 
collusion to circumvent a decidedly smaller tax on the defendant.
155
 Thus, 
if effective, these safeguards should ensure enforcement of a 
nondeductibility regime. If so, the IRS could effectively free ride off the 
state‘s efforts in policing the retributive penalty regime.
156 
In sum, whether the retributive damages penalty should be deductible 
depends primarily on how it should be shared between the state that 
imposes the penalties and the federal government. My sense is that the 
choice between a deductibility or nondeductibility rule should turn on 
whether retributive damages will produce positive spillover benefits across 
state lines. Importantly, the decision to make retributive damages 
deductible or nondeductible should not turn on the likelihood for 
circumvention through settlement. That conclusion, however, assumes that 
the anti-collusion safeguards discussed above are both implemented and 
reasonably effective.
157 
B. Taxing Aggravated Damages 
As explained earlier, aggravated damages for the purpose of victim 
vindication serve as an analogue to compensatory damages in that 
plaintiffs should have the authority to decide whether to seek them against 
defendants whose actions injure or insult the plaintiff‘s dignity. The 
rationale for aggravated damages rests on the premise that the plaintiff‘s 
injury is not covered by the noneconomic damages normally awarded 
under a broadened rubric of compensatory damages. The idea of 
vindicating this insult to the plaintiff‘s dignity monetarily is one 
possibility, but as explained in an earlier companion piece,
158
 the jury 
 
 
 155. It is true that making the retributive penalty nondeductible would increase the incentive to 
collude at the margin. Nevertheless, the nontax incentive to collude is so significant that I believe the 
marginal effect of nondeductibility to be negligible.  
 156. It should be noted that if retributive damages were deductible, there would be additional 
administrative burdens placed on courts and defendants. These relate to potential difficulties in 
calculating a proper gross up, which Professor Polsky and I have discussed in our companion article. 
See Polsky & Markel, supra note 6, at pt. II.C.  
 157. It bears emphasis that improvement of state tort law will not necessarily be foremost on the 
minds of the federal policy makers when confronting tax issues, though such a goal was in fact 
invoked by the Obama administration. See GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 7; cf. Steve R. 
Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof 
Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 415 (1999) (noting that Congress frequently is tempted to ―desire to 
garner political advantage by chastising or curbing the IRS‖).  
 158. See Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17. 
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might also think that the injury to dignity could be repaired through other 
nonpecuniary measures, such as an apology or other remedial efforts.
159 
Assuming arguendo that the jury believes that aggravated monetary 
damages are appropriate as an extra measure of compensation for an 
otherwise uncompensated injury to the plaintiff, then the logic of such 
damages works in favor of treating these aggravated damages similarly to 
compensatory damages, at least for tax purposes. In other words, because 
aggravated damages are plausibly viewed as an aspect of damages meant 
to fully compensate the victim,
160
 they ought to be treated in the same 
manner as compensatory damages for tax purposes.
161
  
If current tax law is used as our lodestar for this proposition, then 
payment of aggravated damages would be deductible by the defendant if 
the plaintiff‘s claim arose in the context of the defendant‘s business. 
 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. This is a source of controversy. Some scholars, like Arthur Ripstein, Tony Sebok, and Tom 
Colby, specifically reject the equation between ―vindicating‖ the plaintiff‘s interest in dignity repair 
and ―compensating‖ the plaintiff for the injury to her dignity, claiming that dignity is not something 
that is ―compensable.‖ See, e.g., Colby, supra note 13, at 435–36, 436 n.187 (citing Ripstein and 
Sebok with approval). But see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract 
Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 91 (2003) (―The courts properly regard such [aggravated] 
damages as compensatory rather than punitive, since they repair a loss, albeit an intangible one.‖). 
 161. A brief but relevant digression: one can imagine someone saying that virtually all torts are a 
product of unreasonable behavior. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort 
Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765 (2009). If one held the view that all torts are unreasonable and should 
thus be discouraged under the tax law, then, generally speaking, one might also think tort damages of 
any stripe should not be tax deductible by the defendant. See, e.g., Conard, supra note 44. There are, 
however, some strong reasons to think compensatory damages should stay deductible. See, e.g., 
discussion supra note 44 (discussing various reasons why Congress is not likely to seriously entertain 
a nondeductibility rule for all damages). In any event, supporters of aggravated damages, e.g., sources 
cited supra note 13, do not have to go as far as saying that all compensatory damages should also be 
nondeductible. They might well prefer that the taxation rule for aggravated damages reflects the 
underlying view that aggravated damages are meant to sanction and condemn, not price, and thereby 
permit or condone the injury to the plaintiff‘s dignity. Cf. Cooter, supra note 75. The problem with this 
view is that asking for a ―condemnatory signal‖ through taxation (by making aggravated damages 
nondeductible, for example, and more analogous to fines and bribes) undermines these scholars‘ 
claims that the tort law system is fundamentally and only a private law system designed to permit 
parties to resolve disputes to their mutual satisfaction. If plaintiffs are asking for a public sanction 
(indirectly through the use of a particular kind of tax rule), they are opening up aggravated damages to 
the charge that they are just retributive damages in the guise of a windfall to the plaintiff. See Markel, 
How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17, at 1416. In short, if aggravated damages are 
meant to go to the plaintiff and be subject to the plaintiff‘s autonomous choices to pursue or not 
pursue, then the award of aggravated damages sits in tension with a signal of public condemnation. 
Making aggravated damages analogous to nondeductible fines or grossed-up and deductible retributive 
damages would dilute the ―private‖ nature of the interest the remedy was meant to vindicate. Either the 
defendant‘s misconduct requires public condemnation (via retributive damages, criminal law, or 
perhaps other public regulatory devices) for her violation of the rights of persons, or the victim‘s 
vindication of her interests against the defendants are subject to private ordering. The victim-
vindication proponents cannot simultaneously prioritize both values. 
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Conversely, the plaintiff would not have to pay taxes on the recovery of 
aggravated damages if the underlying claim involved a physical injury.
162
 
However, the recovery of aggravated damages would be taxable (just like 
compensatory damages are) in cases not involving torts causing physical 
injury.
163
  
Consistent treatment between compensatory and aggravated damages 
would also avoid the difficulty of making allocations of settlements 
between traditional compensatory damages and aggravated monetary 
damages. 
C. Taxing Deterrence Damages 
Earlier, we saw that current punitive damages law is not designed to 
achieve optimal deterrence.
164
 Various law and economics scholars, 
however, have argued that current law ought to be redesigned such that it 
would effectuate optimal deterrence, or what might also be called cost 
internalization.
165
 In general, such a redesigned system would require that 
extracompensatory damages be imposed on the defendant in cases where 
the defendant might have escaped liability for her conduct (because of the 
chance that the plaintiff would have chosen not to bring the action because 
of inconvenience, mercy, or some other reason). The extracompensatory 
damages meant to achieve optimal deterrence (what Part II calls 
―deterrence damages‖) would be determined by multiplying the amount of 
compensatory damages payable by a multiplier that is based on the 
likelihood of the defendant escaping compensation to that plaintiff.
166
 For 
example, if there was a two-in-three chance that the defendant would have 
escaped liability to this plaintiff, the amount of the extracompensatory 
damages would be twice the amount of the plaintiff‘s compensatory 
damages.
167
 This would achieve cost internalization (vis-à-vis that 
 
 
 162. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra Part II.A.  
 165. The leading account of this point of view is Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20. For 
discussion, see supra Part II.A. 
 166. This characterization skips over the interesting but, for our purposes, nonessential discussion 
about the relationship between cost internalization (writ large) and the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007). Here, I am presuming that deterrence 
damages could not, post–Philip Morris, take into account the defendant‘s likelihood of evading 
compensation to strangers to the instant litigation who may also have been harmed. For a general 
overview and my take on this, see Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 17, at 
1407–10 (discussing the prospects of cost internalization after Philip Morris). 
 167. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 889–91 (providing illustrations of the use of the 
―total damages multiplier‖ to determine the amount of punitive damages based upon the likelihood of 
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plaintiff) because the defendant, in choosing whether to engage in the 
conduct at issue, would have to take into account the harm that it causes 
the plaintiff, not just the harm to the plaintiff as discounted by the prospect 
of nonenforcement.
168
  
Should deterrence damages paid by defendants be deductible? 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell argue that to achieve optimal deterrence, 
such deterrence damages ought to be deductible because precautionary 
measures are deductible.
169
 Making ex post deterrence damages 
nondeductible, they argue, would make ex ante precautionary measures 
tax preferred relative to the ex post payment of damages. This would, 
according to Polinsky and Shavell, tip the scales in favor of ex ante 
precautionary measures, resulting in overdeterrence rather than optimal 
deterrence.
170 
While this observation makes good sense, a couple of points are in 
order. First, even if deterrence damages remained deductible for business-
related torts (as Polinsky and Shavell propose), current tax law still favors 
ex ante precautionary measures over ex post damages. The costs of 
precautionary measures (e.g., employee training expenses, equipment 
repairs, research and development costs) are typically deductible 
immediately,
171
 while ex post damages are deductible only when paid.
172
 
Because precautionary measures are immediately deductible, the 
taxpayer‘s return on these expenditures is effectively tax free.173 If a 
 
 
the wrongdoer escaping liability). 
 168. Of course, what is described in the text is not the same thing as ―full‖ or ―total‖ cost 
internalization because the inquiry is localized to the plaintiff, and not all the possible harmed parties. 
Total cost internalization, though, remains feasible (even post–Philip Morris) to the extent that 
jurisdictions make available class actions or other aggregative-litigation strategies that protect the 
rights of defendants; once a class is certified, the people who were previously nonparties become 
parties to the litigation. 
 169. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 929–31; see also Zelenak, supra note 32, at 66 
(similarly arguing that safety precautions should not be tax preferred, from an optimal deterrence 
perspective, to damages). Under Polinsky and Shavell‘s regime, juries would not need to be tax aware 
nor would they need to gross up deterrence damages to arrive at the proper amount of deterrence 
damages. This is because the amount of deterrence damages is determined simply by applying a 
multiplier to the pre-tax amount of compensatory harm suffered by the plaintiff. If done properly, this 
would generally result in optimal deterrence; thus, there would be no need for any further adjustment.  
 170. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 929–31. 
 171. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263A-4, -5 (2008); Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 105 TAX 
NOTES 435 (2004). While the generalization in the text is largely correct, it bears mention that the 
costs of some precautionary measures—such as purchasing new and safer equipment—are not 
immediately deductible but are instead recoverable through depreciation deductions. 
 172. I.R.C. § 461(h) (2006). 
 173. See Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1019 (1989) (explaining that allowing an immediate deduction for expenditures that provide a future 
benefit has the effect of exempting the yield on the expenditure from tax). 
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taxpayer chooses to forgo the precautionary measure, the taxpayer would 
have to fund the resulting ex post damage liability with investments that 
would generate taxable returns. The result is an existing, implicit tax 
incentive for ex ante precautionary measures over ex post damages.
174 
This tax incentive in favor of precautionary measures is not intentional; 
rather, it results from the impossibility of accounting for the two 
alternative transactions (i.e., the purchase of ex ante precautionary 
measures or the payment of ex post damages) more precisely.
175
 
Nevertheless, the tax incentive exists; therefore, deterrence-minded 
scholars, such as Polinsky, Shavell, and Zelenak, should have argued that 
making deterrence damages nondeductible would exacerbate (rather than 
cause) an existing tax preference for ex ante precautionary measures over 
ex post damages.
176 
 
 
 174. See George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 
1192–1205 (1987) (discussing the implicit tax preference in favor of intangible capital expenditures 
compared to economically similar tangible capital expenditures). To illustrate the implicit tax incentive 
in favor of ex ante precautions, consider a business that has a choice of paying $100 in precautionary 
measures immediately or $106 of damages in exactly one year. Assume that the prevailing discount 
rate is 6%. In a world without taxes, the business would be perfectly indifferent between the two 
options. It could pay the $100 in precautionary measures now or it could invest the $100 in a reserve at 
6%. In the latter case, the account would grow at the end of year one to $106, the amount of damages 
for which the business would be liable. Once income taxes are introduced, however, this indifference 
is disrupted. Assuming a 40% tax rate, and that there is sufficient income to offset, the business‘s 
after-tax cost of the precautionary measures is $60. Because the precautionary expense is immediately 
deductible, the business‘s federal tax liability is $40 ($100 x 40%) less than it would have been had it 
not paid for the precautionary measures. Therefore, the after-tax cost of the precautionary measures is 
only $60 (the excess of the pre-tax cost ($100) over the value of the deduction ($40)). Had the business 
instead invested the $60 after-tax in a reserve fund, the fund would grow to $62.16 at the end of one 
year. The $60 investment would earn $3.60 ($60 x 6%) pre-tax. The tax on the $3.60 would be $1.44 
($3.60 x 40%), leaving $2.16 of after-tax yield. The $62.16 reserve fund would yield a damage award 
of $103.60. This is because the damage award is deductible when paid; a payment of $103.60 of 
damages would cost $62.16 after tax because a $103.60 deduction is worth $41.44 ($103.60 x 40%). 
This $103.60 payment would be insufficient to cover the $106 of damages. To fully fund the $106 
damages liability, the business would have had to originally invest $61.39 in the reserve fund, which is 
$1.39 more than the after-tax cost of the precautionary measures. (This $61.39 would grow to $63.60 
in one year when it is invested at a 3.60% after-tax rate. The resulting $63.60 equals $106 after it is 
increased to take into account the $42.40 ($106 x 40%) value of the $106 deduction upon payment.) 
Thus, once taxes are introduced, the business would prefer to pay for the ex ante precautionary 
measures (which costs only $60 after tax) to the ex post damages (which would need to be funded with 
$61.30 of after-tax dollars). To be sure, there are complications having to do with the mess of real life, 
but the upshot is that the tax advantage for ex ante precautionary measures will have a bigger effect on 
defendants‘ choices between ex ante and ex post approaches when the timing and extent of possible 
damages liability is foreseeable. Moreover, the significance of the tax advantage in actual cases would 
depend upon a number of other factors, including the type of precaution taken, the chronological 
separation between the year of precaution and the year of liability, and the defendant's applicable tax 
rate. 
 175. See id. at 1192–99 (explaining that the preference in favor of expenditures for business 
intangible capital arises from the difficulty in accounting for these expenditures accurately). 
 176. I am grateful to Professor Polsky for bringing this issue to my attention and helping elaborate 
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Second, some could argue that because the receipt of compensatory 
damages in personal injury cases is the result of a conversion of human 
capital to cash that is wholly involuntary on the part of the plaintiff, there 
ought to be some social preference for ex ante precautionary measures 
over ex post damages.
177
 In other words, given the involuntariness of a tort 
―transaction,‖ the law arguably should systemically err on the side of 
overdeterrence by preferring ex ante precautionary measures. This 
preference could be implemented in the form of a multiplier (e.g., 110%) 
on the compensatory damages amount or it could be accomplished by 
making deterrence damages nondeductible. Either option would provide a 
―kicker‖ to induce precautionary measures.  
Notice that if the multiplier approach were used, the kicker would inure 
to the benefit of the plaintiff in the form of additional damages. If a rule of 
nondeductibility were used, the kicker would redound to the benefit of the 
federal government in the form of additional tax paid by the defendant.  
One significant concern with implementing the kicker through the 
nondeductibility approach is that the amount of the kicker would vary 
based on the defendant‘s marginal tax rate. Moreover, under the 
nondeductibility approach, there would be no kicker whatsoever in cases 
where the plaintiff‘s claim did not arise out of the defendant‘s business —
in that case, the cost of ex ante precautionary measures would also be 
nondeductible. These disparate effects are very difficult to support. After 
all, if a kicker is deemed necessary to encourage ex ante precautions, the 
kicker should apply in all cases.  
Administratively, it would ordinarily be quite difficult in cases that 
settle to separate deterrence damages from traditional compensatory 
damages, which would remain deductible. Because of the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Philip Morris, I proposed that deterrence damages would 
normally be limited by the probability that the defendant would evade 
compensating the instant plaintiff, and, consequently, I suggested that such 
deterrence damages be paid to the plaintiff.
178
 If so, the state would have 
 
 
it in this Article. Professor Zelenak has also adverted to my attention the possibility that, to the extent 
prejudgment interest is not available to plaintiffs, that would create a nontax incentive in favor of 
damages and against precautions, which the tax incentive in the opposite direction would only partially 
counteract. Of course, juries might essentially but unwittingly provide prejudgment interest by 
thinking in terms of ―today‘s dollars‖ when awarding pain and suffering or other noneconomic 
damages even where, technically, prejudgment interest is unavailable. So this would be another factor 
that would complicate the analysis in the text. 
 177. The argument is somewhat stronger in cases involving physical injury or sickness, as 
opposed to fraud. Fraud or other financial torts can be readily remedied through money; torts involving 
physical injury or sickness are harder if not impossible to recompense financially. 
 178. I base this judgment on account of the inference that Philip Morris would require that the 
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no role in policing allocations between deterrence damages and 
compensatory damages—in contrast to its more robust role in the 
retributive damages context. Thus, a rule of nondeductibility for 
deterrence damages would require the IRS to separate these damages from 
traditional compensatory damages, which would be extremely difficult. 
On the other hand, if deterrence damages were paid to the state (on the 
theory that the deterrence damages would result in a pure windfall to 
plaintiffs if paid to them), the state would then have an interest in policing 
settlements. In that case, a rule of nondeductibility could possibly be more 
feasibly administered because the IRS could free ride off the state‘s 
policing efforts.
179 
In the end, deterrence damages should be deductible. Even if one 
believes that ex ante precautions should be tax preferred relative to ex post 
damages, such a tax preference already exists. Furthermore, administering 
a nondeductible regime would be nearly impossible unless deterrence 
damages were paid to the state. 
In sum, if states passed reforms of the nature described in Part II, then 
aggravated and deterrence damages ought to be deductible, and, therefore, 
§ 162(f) of the Code would likely need no adjustment.
180
 The appropriate 
treatment is less clear with respect to retributive damages. I have 
suggested some ways that policy makers might go about assessing this 
issue and how one might resolve that challenge once better information 
became available. Assuming that we want retributive damages to be 
deductible for the reasons already adumbrated, then statutory amendment 
would be required; if policy makers thought that, on balance, a 
nondeductibility rule was preferable for retributive damages, then no 
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code is required.
181 
 
 
deterrence damages be limited in scope (i.e., the question is what is the likelihood that the defendant 
would have evaded compensating this plaintiff), and, thus, the amount of deterrence damages would 
normally be directed to the plaintiff (as opposed to a general fund for future/other victims). See supra 
note 166. 
 179. Making the deterrence damages go to the state, while still allowing their deductibility, would 
likely require a revision to § 162(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, which currently disallows 
deductions of any fines ―or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law.‖ I.R.C. 
§ 162(f) (2006). The issue would be whether deterrence damages fit comfortably under this rubric; one 
could say, however, that deterrence damages are not meant to assign any condemnatory signal, unlike 
a fine.  
 180. But see supra note 179 (considering statutory implications if deterrence damages were to go 
to the state instead of the plaintiff). 
 181. As a result, if Congress approaches the possibility of revising the statute with retributive 
damages in mind, it may make the error of writing just one tax rule for states across the nation; a 
sounder approach would be to contemplate legislative diversity at the state level, and say something 
like: the taxation of retributive damages will be contingent upon X or Y factors. 
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CONCLUSION 
Current legal practices result in the significant under-punishment of 
business defendants because punitive damages jurors do not take into 
account the fact that these defendants are allowed to deduct their punitive 
damages awards. To solve this problem, President Obama recently 
proposed to make all punitive damages nondeductible—a proposal that has 
in the past been supported by a number of policy makers and academics.
182
  
Properly evaluated, the under-punishment problem can, at least in 
theory, be corrected either by making jurors tax aware or by making all 
punitive damages nondeductible. Practically, though, the choice between 
these mutually exclusive solutions depends on how easily a rule of 
nondeductibility would be circumvented through preverdict settlements. If 
a rule of nondeductibility is easily circumvented, as it is likely to be, a rule 
of tax awareness is always the better solution to the under-punishment 
problem. This is primarily because, when a rule of nondeductibility is 
circumvented through settlement, defendants would participate in the 
gains from circumvention in the form of lower after-tax settlement costs, 
resulting in precisely the same under-punishment problem that 
nondeductibility was intended to correct. On the other hand, there is no 
similar risk of circumvention under the alternative solution of making 
jurors tax aware. 
While tax awareness would best solve the under-punishment problem, 
it would simultaneously increase the windfalls of punitive damages 
plaintiffs. However, there is simply no way under current punitive 
damages law to reduce under-punishment without simultaneously 
augmenting plaintiff windfalls. The tradeoff is a byproduct of the jumbled 
way current punitive damages law engrafts ―public law‖ values on a 
private dispute resolution system not entirely capable of effectuating those 
values.  
To avoid such an unfortunate tradeoff, reform of punitive damages law 
would be required. This Article sketches a vision of such a reform and 
describes its corresponding tax rules. As explained before, the appropriate 
tax treatment of tort damages should depend on the particular purpose 
being pursued and vindicated. In this respect, the recommendations herein 
stake out a more nuanced middle ground between those scholars and 
policy makers touting nondeductibility for all punitive damages and those 
 
 
 182. See sources cited supra note 6. 
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endorsing the current rule allowing a deduction for all punitive damages 
paid by business defendants. 
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